



NHSMUN

National High School Model United Nations

2023

BACKGROUND GUIDE: DISEC

Topic A: Preventing Non-State Actors from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

Topic B: The Ethics of Surveillance Technology

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Meg Torres
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Amy Zeng

Dear Delegates,

My name is Hemani Marfatia, and I am incredibly excited to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee for the 2023 National High School Model United Nations Conference. My Co-Director, Patricia, and I are so excited to meet all of you while having a weekend full of substantive debate and effective resolution writing.

Last year I was an assistant director for the Special Political and Decolonization committee, where I began to love this organization. I have been doing MUN since the 4th grade, and as cheesy as it sounds, it has made me who I am today. It shaped my career, gave me my best friends, and, most importantly, gave me a purpose. I hope that the research, preparation, and debate you do over the coming months will inspire you just the same. Patricia and I have been working so hard for this conference, and we hope you enjoy your time at NHSMUN.

I am a sophomore at American University (AU) and double majoring in finance and international relations. Outside the classroom, I am involved in the American Bhangra Crew, a competitive South-Asian dance team, a programmer for the AU Consulting Club, and a brother in Alpha Kappa Psi. Going to school in Washington, DC, has been amazing. I enjoy going out, trying new restaurants, and going to the beach. Some of my hobbies include weightlifting, cooking, and reading all the romance novels that I can find.

After much deliberation and research, we decided on the topics “Preventing Non-State Actors from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” and “Surveillance Ethics.” Both are incredibly intertwined with the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations. As a delegate, you must consider how the international community can come together to create an enforceable mandate, clear legislation, and equally protect every citizen. We are so excited to see you all debate this topic and put your months of research and preparation into action. If you have any questions/comments/concerns or just want to talk, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am so excited to meet you and have an amazing week together in March.

Hemani Marfatia

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Session I

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Scarlett Royal
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Amy Zeng

Dear Delegates,

I am incredibly excited to welcome you to NHSMUN 2023! My name is Patricia Arizaleta, and I'm the Director of the Disarmament and International Security Committee for Session II! I was born and raised in Caracas, Venezuela, and moved to Madrid, Spain, in 2019, where I started my degree in Biomedical Engineering. I'm currently doing my junior year as an exchange student at the University of Florida. Here I'm a member of the beach volleyball club, and in my free time, I enjoy traveling, discovering new places, going out with friends, and taking naps.

I have plenty of Model UN experience back in Caracas, where I have staffed several conferences and served as Faculty Advisor for my school's national MUN delegation during my senior year. This is my fourth NHSMUN; I attended the conference as a delegate in high school, first to WHO in 2017 and then to DISEC in 2018, and I was part of the staff last year as an Assistant Director for DISEC. I can't wait to come back. I am very excited about the unique opportunity you will have to participate in the world's largest model United Nations conference.

This year's topics are Preventing Non-State Actors from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction and Surveillance Technology and Drone Ethics, which are incredibly relevant. Reading this background guide will provide you with a complete outline of the most important aspects of these topics and hopefully motivate you to find effective and innovative solutions. That being said, please feel free to contact me or my co-director Hemani if you have any questions or concerns. We would be happy to help you prepare yourself to your fullest capabilities. We can't wait to meet you all in March!

All the best,

Patricia Arizaleta

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Session II

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A Note on the NHSMUN Difference

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2023! We are Ming-May Hu and Ana Margarita Gil, and we are this year's Secretary-General and Director-General. Thank you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world's largest and most diverse Model United Nations conference for secondary school students. We are thrilled to welcome you to New York City in March!

As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today's brightest thinkers into tomorrow's leaders. Our organization provides a uniquely tailored experience for all in attendance through innovative and accessible programming. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience, and this idea permeates throughout NHSMUN.

Realism and accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. Each NHSMUN committee is a simulation of a real deliberative body so that delegates can research what their country has said in the committee. Our topics are chosen from the issues currently on the agenda of that committee (except historical committees, which take topics from the appropriate time period). This creates incredible opportunities for our delegates to conduct first-hand research by reading the actual statements their country has made and the resolutions they have supported. We also strive to invite real UN, NGO, and field experts into each committee through our committee speakers program. Moreover, we arrange meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System.

Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. Part of what makes NHSMUN so special is its diverse delegate base. As such, when NHSMUN distributes awards, we de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward students who excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. More importantly, we seek to develop an environment in which delegates can employ their critical thought processes and share ideas with their counterparts from around the world. Given our delegates' plurality of perspectives and experiences, we center our programming around the values of diplomacy and teamwork. In particular, our dais look for and promote constructive leadership that strives towards consensus, as real ambassadors do in the United Nations.

Debate founded on strong knowledge and accessibility: With knowledgeable staff members and delegates from over 70 countries, NHSMUN can facilitate an enriching experience reliant on substantively rigorous debate. To ensure this high quality of debate, our staff members produce detailed, accessible, and comprehensive topic guides (like the one below) to prepare delegates for the nuances inherent in each global issue. This process takes over six months, during which the Directors who lead our committees develop their topics with the valuable input of expert contributors. Because these topics are always changing and evolving, NHSMUN also produces update papers intended to bridge the gap of time between when the background guides are published and when committee starts in March. As such, this guide is designed to be a launching point from which delegates should delve further into their topics. The detailed knowledge that our Directors provide in this background guide through diligent research aims to increase critical thinking within delegates at NHSMUN.

Extremely engaged staff: At NHSMUN, our staffers care deeply about delegates' experiences and what they take away from their time at NHSMUN. Before the conference, our Directors and Assistant Directors are trained rigorously through hours of workshops and exercises both virtual and in-person to provide the best conference experience possible. At the conference, delegates will have the opportunity to meet their dais members prior to the first committee session, where they may engage

one-on-one to discuss their committees and topics. Our Directors and Assistant Directors are trained and empowered to be experts on their topics and they are always available to rapidly answer any questions delegates may have prior to the conference. Our Directors and Assistant Directors read every position paper submitted to NHSMUN and provide thoughtful comments on those submitted by the feedback deadline. Our staff aims not only to tailor the committee experience to delegates' reflections and research but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates' thoughts can be heard.

Empowering participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its member states to create resolutions most likely to make a meaningful impact on the world. That is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. We believe that to properly delve into an issue and produce fruitful debate, it is crucial to focus the entire energy and attention of the room on the topic at hand. Our Rules of Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of each delegate's country assignment or skill level. Additionally, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. MUN delegates are well researched and aware of the UN's priorities, and they can serve as the vanguard for action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, we are proud to connect students with other action-oriented organizations to encourage further work on the topics.

Focused committee time: We feel strongly that face-to-face interpersonal connections during debate are critical to producing superior committee experiences and allow for the free flow of ideas. Ensuring policies based on equality and inclusion is one way in which NHSMUN guarantees that every delegate has an equal opportunity to succeed in committee. In order to allow communication and collaboration to be maximized during committee, we have a very dedicated administrative team who work throughout the conference to type up, format, and print draft resolutions and working papers.

As always, we welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2023 and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates.

Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference.

Best,

Ming-May Hu
Secretary-General

Ana Margarita Gil
Director-General

A Note on Research and Preparation

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to NHSMUN in March.

The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging, but to assist delegates, we have updated our [Beginner Delegate Guide](#) and [Advanced Delegate Guide](#). In particular, these guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage. They can help transform a sometimes overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.

To accurately represent a country, delegates must be able to articulate its policies. Accordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a position paper for each topic on the committee's agenda. In delegations with two students, we strongly encourage each student to research each topic to ensure that they are prepared to debate no matter which topic is selected first. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the NHSMUN Research Guide. To summarize, position papers should be structured into three sections:

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's country. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be **no more than 10 pages** long double-spaced with standard margins and font size. **We recommend 3–5 pages per topic as a suitable length.** The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned country and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.

Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to their committee Directors via [myDais](#) on or before **February 24, 2023**. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee's dais, a position must be submitted on or before **February 3, 2023**. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the dais of each committee and returned prior to your arrival at the conference.

Complete instructions for how to submit position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via email. If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, please contact us at info@imuna.org.

Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.

Committee History

The General Assembly First Committee, also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), was established in 1945 when the charter of the United Nations was ratified. Since then, it has been the main domain of discourse for policy making.¹ DISEC centers on topics surrounding “disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace.”² The committee aims to maintain international peace and security through governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. As DISEC does not work in a specific region, it aims to prioritize global security all around the globe through promoting cooperation and stability and strengthening interactions between states.

DISEC is part of the General Assembly (GA), meeting in New York at the UN Headquarters.³ Like other General Assembly committees, its membership includes all 193 members of the UN, making it one of the most representative bodies in the world. In addition to its role in the General Assembly, DISEC also works closely with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which implements UN policies on disarmament at all levels.⁴ Each member has one vote in the decision-making process.⁵ Governed by the Charter of the United Nations and following its mission of international cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, DISEC has worked closely with other entities such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the International Atomic Agency (IAEA), and the Geneva Office.⁶ Furthermore, while DISEC cannot directly participate in the Security Council’s decision-making process, it still may suggest specific issues for consideration.⁷

Through cooperation with these different groups and the supervision of various supplementary committees within the UN, DISEC leads disarmament and security on a global scale. Among the primary achievements of the First Committee are many of the United Nations conventions on disarmament and the use of arms. DISEC was also involved in developing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the various nuclear-weapon-free zones that exist around the world.⁸ Although the committee cannot authorize individual state action, sanctions, or armed intervention as it is out of its scope, it has proven to be a very important and influential organ.⁹ Its resolutions deal with some of the most complex topics in the international community. A recent example of this is the seven draft resolutions approved on November 5, 2019, that helped prevent the militarization of outer space designed for states with extensive space capabilities.¹⁰

DISEC considers all matters regarding disarmament and international security. These topics may range from biological warfare to the ethics of surveillance to nuclear proliferation. Although there is quite a range of topics that can be explored in DISEC, the First Committee’s utmost priority is indeed security. This focus also makes the committee work closely with the UN Security Council, one of the six principal organs of the UN.¹¹ Indeed, it is the only General Assembly Committee entitled to verbatim records coverage. Therefore, the First Committee continues to strive for international security through collaborative multilateral

1 UN Affairs. “Feature: The UN General Assembly’s First Committee - Disarmament and International Security Issues,” UN News, December 27, 2012, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/12/429112-feature-un-general-assemblys-first-committee-disarmament-and-international>

2 United Nations, “Disarmament and International Security (First Committee),” Accessed September 18, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>

3 United Nations, “Disarmament and International Security (First Committee),”

4 “UNODA: Overview,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs: Strengthening Peace and Security Through Disarmament, Accessed September 16, 2021, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/GA.shtml>.

5 “About Us,” United Nations. General Assembly of the United Nations. Accessed September 17, 2021. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us>.

6 “United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly,” General Assembly of the United Nations. Accessed September 17, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/resources.shtml>.

7 “Main Committees,” General Assembly of the United Nations, accessed September 16, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/maincommittees/index.shtml>

8 UNODA, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,” accessed September 17, 2021, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwzf/>; UNODA, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water” accessed September 17, 2021, https://treaties.unoda.org/t/test_ban

9 UNGA, “Functions and powers of the General Assembly,” accessed September 17, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

10 “United Nations First Committee.” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World. Accessed September 16, 2021, <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/un-first-committee/>.

11 Rose, Caroline. “Research Binder Friday: DISEC.” January 22, 2016. <https://bestdelegate.com/research-binder-friday-disec/>

negotiations.

Fast action is imperative to preserve international security. Therefore, forums like DISEC are facing the greatest challenges when it comes to decision-making. Delegates are highly encouraged to participate in this multilateral debate, preserve international security, and raise awareness of DISEC's mission.



DISEC

NHSMUN 2023



TOPIC A:

PREVENTING NON-STATE ACTORS FROM ACQUIRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Photo Credit: Guy Volb

Introduction

In the modern world, malicious non-state actors actively utilize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without respect for life. While these weapons are already a threat to international security in the hands of states, their use by violent non-state actors has unlimited repercussions. There are concerns about the safety of extensive reserves of weapons-usable materials beyond those permitted by international regulation.¹ Scientific advances and emerging technologies have lowered barriers to producing chemical and biological weapons by terrorist organizations.² The nuclear weapons industry continues to grow with new multimillionaire contracts each year.³ As a result, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are more accessible than ever.

Additionally, there is a growing link between WMDs, terrorism, and cybersecurity. Non-state actors can already manipulate cyberweapons to create direct or indirect fatalities.⁴ Recognizing the dangerous threat of WMD proliferation, members of the international community have created treaties and agencies to prevent non-state actors from obtaining and manufacturing such weapons. These measures, such as resolution 1540 (2004), must be improved to fit these modern challenges. The international community will need innovative solid solutions to overcome these modern threats. The First committee's mission is to find long-term solutions to this challenge and restore the protection of all kinds of life against mass destruction.

History and Description of the Issue

Early Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

A WMD is any device capable of inflicting large-scale death and destruction, causing significant economic and environmental

damage.⁵ The term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) originated in 1937. The phrase was first used in reference to a German air force attack on the small town of Guernica, Spain.⁶ The attack is known as one of the first raids against a civilian population by a modern air force. It reportedly destroyed over 70 percent of the town, killing one-third of its inhabitants.⁷ Guernica served as the first experiment for the new military tactic: blanket-bombing a civilian population to discourage the enemy.⁸ At that point, these aerial battleships seemed to be an overpowering threat to civilians.⁹ This was the case in World War II, with the American firebombing of Tokyo.¹⁰

With the atomic bomb launched during World War II in Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, the power of conventional bombs dwindled in the wake of an entire city being destroyed. About 66,000 people were killed instantly, and 69,000 were injured by a single nuclear weapon.¹¹ The term WMD has varied widely over the last 50 years. At different times, the term has described simple aerial bombs and every type of weapon capable of killing a large number

1 United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction Only Way to Prevent Non-State Actors from Acquiring Them, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Security Council | UN Press," press release, December 15, 2016, <https://press.un.org/en/2016/dsgsm1035.doc.htm>.

2 United Nations, "Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction."

3 Susi Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction: Private companies and the nuclear weapon industry* (Utrecht: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, May 2019), https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcgclefindmkaj/https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_Producers-Report-FINAL.pdf

4 United Nations, "Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction."

5 "Weapon of Mass Destruction," Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified November 14, 2007, <https://www.britannica.com/technology/weapon-of-mass-destruction>.

6 Will Mallon, "WMD: Where Did the Phrase Come from?" *Columbian College of Arts and Science*, 2003, <https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1522#>.

7 "April 26, 1937: The Bombing of Guernica," Zinn Education Project, last modified April 27, 2020, <https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/bombing-of-guernica/>.

8 Almudena López, "Gernika - 75 Years On," *El País*, April 25, 2012, https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2012/04/25/inenglish/1335366383_825388.html.

9 Encyclopedia Britannica, "Weapons of Mass Destruction."

10 Encyclopedia Britannica, "Weapons of Mass Destruction."

11 Thomas Gaulkin, "Counting the Dead at Hiroshima and Nagasaki," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 17, 2020, <https://thebulletin.org/2020/08/counting-the-dead-at-hiroshima-and-nagasaki/>

of people.¹² There are three main types of WMDs: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Other types of WMDs widely condemned by the international community are antipersonnel mines, suicide bombs, cluster bombs (used in bombardments of cities), and depleted uranium (used to manufacture especially harmful ammunition due to its high density and melting point).¹³

During the Cold War, which lasted from 1941 to 1991, the term “weapons of mass destruction” mainly referred to nuclear weapons.¹⁴ The United States, the Soviet Union, and other large powers built vast stockpiles that contained thousands of bombs, missile warheads, and artillery shells.¹⁵ Since the end of the Cold War, the main concern with weapons of mass destruction has been their proliferation—the ability of smaller powers or international groups to produce and use these weapons.¹⁷ Nuclear materials, technologies, and knowledge are more accessible today than at any time in history.¹⁸

Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons

Although the term “weapons of mass destruction” was first used to describe the massive destruction caused by aerial bombs, it had nothing to do with biological or chemical weapons as it does today.¹⁹ The current use of this phrase as a synonym for these three types of weapons was created in Resolution No. 687 of the United Nations Security Council in 1991. This resolution refers to the threat posed by all weapons of mass destruction to peace and security. In particular, it focuses on nuclear and chemical weapons, also called NBC weapons.²⁰ The NBC threat emanating from violent non-state actors is even more complicated to assess.

According to the Office of Nations Disarmament Affairs, “nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future

12 Mallon, “WMD: Where Did the Phrase come from?”

13 “Depleted Uranium,” United States Environmental Protection Agency, last modified July 14, 2022, <https://www.epa.gov/radtown/depleted-uranium>.

14 Richard Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 1998, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1998-01-01/new-threat-mass-destruction>.

15 “Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Encyclopedia Britannica Kids, accessed July 14, 2022, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilt_Chamberlin.

16 Encyclopedia Britannica Kids, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

17 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

18 Jack Beard, “International Security: Multiple Actors, Multiple Threats,” *College of Law, Faculty Publications University of Nebraska*, (1998):173-177, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=lawfacpub>.

19 Mallon, “WMD: Where Did the Phrase come from?”

20 UN Security Council, Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (April 8, 1991).

Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are considered the most dangerous weapons available today.

Credit: Fastfission





Old Chemical Weapons (OCWs) being destroyed in Poelkapelle, Belgium
 Credit: OPCW

generations through its long-term catastrophic effects.”²¹ Nuclear weapons were only used twice in World War II, in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. About 13,400 nuclear weapons are believed to still be in our world today, and over 2,000 nuclear tests have been carried out.²² As of 2018, nine countries are considered to be world nuclear powers, meaning they have successfully manufactured nuclear weapons. The countries are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.²³ However, only the first five mentioned are members of the Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as India, Israel, and Pakistan have refused to sign it. North Korea initially signed the treaty but later withdrew.²⁴

The second type of weapon of mass destruction is biological weapons. A biological weapon is composed of microorganisms or toxic substances produced by living organisms that are intentionally released to cause disease and death in humans, animals, or plants.²⁵ Their use is known as

biological warfare and is considered a war crime. An attack of this kind is especially dangerous because microscopic biological agents can be transferred through water, food, or any other minor form of contact. This makes them appealing weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. They are hard to detect, easy to use, and can cause a large number of deaths in a short time. Biological weapons have not been used in modern warfare since World War II.²⁶ However, the ease with which biological and chemical agents can be prepared, packaged, delivered, and detonated has raised concerns that they may become the weapon of choice for terrorists.

The third modern type of WMD is chemical weapons. A chemical weapon encompasses any chemical substance used to attack different body systems.²⁷ They can be choking agents that attack the respiratory system, blister agents that burn the skin, or nerve agents that interfere with the nervous system. The latter is considered to be the most lethal.²⁸ The modern use of chemical weapons began with World I

21 “Nuclear Weapons,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/>.

22 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Nuclear Weapons.”

23 Shannon Kile and Hans Kristensen, “World Nuclear Forces,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, <https://sipri.org/yearbook/2019/06>.

24 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified June 24, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-on-the-Non-proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons>.

25 “Biological Weapons,” World Health Organization, accessed July 13, 2022, https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1.

26 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

27 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

28 Frank Gardner, “Ukraine Conflict: How Will We Know If Russia Used Chemical Weapons?” *BBC News*, April 12, 2022, <https://www>.

when some countries, including Germany and Britain, used poisonous chlorine and mustard gas to cause many battlefield casualties.²⁹ Such weapons consisted of commercial chemicals put into ammunition and had devastating results.³⁰ Since the First World War, chemical weapons have claimed more than a million victims worldwide.³¹ The Cold War saw chemical weapons' significant development. In the 1970s and 1980s, 25 states were developing chemical weapons capabilities.³² But since the end of World War II, chemical weapons have been reported to have been used in only a few cases, for instance, by the Syrian government in the fight with opposition rebel forces in the Syrian Civil war.³³

Types of Non-State Actors

The early history of the term “weapons of mass destruction” refers to its use by different countries, mainly in war. However, this problem is constantly changing due to rapid technological and scientific advances. The reality is that the list of potential proliferators is not limited to countries.³⁴ Non-state actors are international entities that are not aligned or associated with any one particular state but influence international politics and economics.³⁵ Many entities fit this definition, from organized crime groups like the Italian Mafia to multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola. As for WMDs and non-state actors, the security focus is usually on terrorist groups. Many of these groups use WMDs to inflict damage and destruction

on massive scales. For example, in 2007, both ISIL and Al-Qaeda used chlorine to build vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in terrorist attacks.³⁶

Violent non-state actors (VNSAs) are different organizations willing and capable of using violence to achieve their objectives.³⁷ Armed non-state actors operate without state control.³⁸ Their activity complicates traditional conflict management. Two particularly dangerous and influential non-state actors are the international black market in WMD materials and terrorist organizations. VNSAs weaponize chemical, biological, and nuclear materials.³⁹ The development of WMDs is one of their most important targets because of the massive damage they can inflict in a short amount of time.⁴⁰ History has proven that VNSAs cannot independently produce deliverable weapons of mass destruction. Research conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies has shown that varying VNSAs have varying identities, values, and strategies. To many VNSAs with explicit political goals, WMDs are often considered overkill and counterproductive to these larger political goals.⁴¹

States and terrorist organizations can easily exploit legitimate businesses up and down the WMD supply chain to obtain dual-use knowledge and technologies.⁴² Corporations are important examples of non-state actors. By definition, they are legal entities such as Samsung or McDonald's, which

bbc.com/news/world-europe-60708350.

29 “Chemical,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/chemical/>.

30 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Chemical.”

31 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Chemical.”

32 “Chemical Weapons,” United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 13, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/>

33 Gardner, “Ukraine Conflict: How Will We Know If Russia Used Chemical Weapons?”

34 Togzhan Kassenova, “The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed July 13, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/04/exploitation-of-global-financial-systems-for-weapons-of-mass-destruction-wmd-proliferation-pub-81221>.

35 Harley Davidson, “Non-State Actors & Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Study.com, accessed July 31, 2022, <https://study.com/academy/lesson/non-state-actors-weapons-of-mass-destruction.html>.

36 Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism the Once and Future Threat,” *PRISM National defense Institute* 7, no. 3 (May 15, 2018): 29-30, <https://cco.ndu.edu/News/article/1507339/wmd-terrorism-the-once-and-future-threat/>.

37 Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 883 (September 2011): 1-2, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-883-schneckener.pdf>.

38 Hofmann and Schneckener, “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies,” 1-2.

39 Adam Schmitz, “How Violent Non-State Actors Learned to Stop Worrying and Simply Buy the Bomb?” *International Institute For Counter-Terrorism*, February 24, 2021, <https://ict.org.il/how-violent-non-state-actors-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-simply-buy-the-bomb/>.

40 Schmitz, “How Violent Non-State Actors Learned to Stop Worrying and Simply Buy the Bomb?”

41 James M. Smith, Jerry Mark Long, Thomas H. Johnson, *Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations: Concepts and Cases* (El Paso: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2008), https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP64_StrategicCulture.pdf

42 Brian D. Finlay, *Minding Our Own Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain* (Washington: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, January 31, 2009), <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=38295>.

are created by individuals to operate for profit.⁴³ Some corporations seek to profit from the production of WMDs, such as Huntington Ingalls Industries in the US and Jacobs Engineering in the UK. According to a 2019 report by PAX, both companies make billions in profits each year. Huntington Ingalls Industries is connected to several facilities connected to nuclear weapons development, with more than USD 28 billion in current contracts. Jacobs Engineering is currently in a 25-year contract with the UK Atomic Weapons establishment for EUR 29.6 billion.⁴⁴ These are just two of the many private companies working alongside governments to produce WMDs. In some cases, WMD proliferators may not be aware of their involvement. Larger companies have the resources to implement internal programs that help to detect any suspicious orders. However, smaller ones do not have the same resources and may fail to see if their company contributes to WMD production.⁴⁵

Lastly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually non-profit organizations that work towards a positive change in health, education, infrastructure, and human rights, among many other areas.⁴⁶ The nonprofit sector is separate from the public and private sectors. However, it may collaborate with either of them. In the issue posed by the acquisition of WMD by non-state actors, NGOs play a different role than other non-state actors. They cooperate with different governmental or intergovernmental organizations like the UN to find solutions. Some examples of NGOs in the Non-proliferation of WMD field are the Arms Control Association, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the NGO Committee on Disarmament, and the Nuclear

Control Institute.⁴⁷

Regulations and Past Actions

International measures to end the use of deadly weapons have been developed for centuries.⁴⁸ The first international agreement to regulate the use of weapons of mass destruction was in 1675, when France and Germany signed a treaty in Strasbourg banning the use of poisoned bullets.⁴⁹ Nearly 200 years later, the Brussels Convention on the Laws and Customs of War tried to prohibit using poison or poisonous weapons and any material to cause necessary suffering.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, the convention never entered into force because not all the governments were willing to accept it as a binding agreement.⁵¹

WMD disarmament efforts in the 20th century were based on the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.⁵² The second Hague Convention of 1907 reaffirmed an earlier ban on the use of poison or poisoned weapons. Despite these measures, more than a million people were blinded, disfigured, or seriously injured on the battlefield due to the use of toxic chemical and biological weapons during the First World War.⁵³ Public concern over chemical warfare led to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of Asphyxiating Gasses, Poisonous or Other, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol.⁵⁴ The Protocol was signed at a conference held in Geneva by the League of Nations and entered into force on February 8, 1928.⁵⁵ However, the Geneva Protocol had many shortcomings and did not fully prohibit producing or possessing these weapons. Research developed by Eric Croddy, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, revealed that the protocol did not

43 “Corporation,” Corporate Finance Institute, May 8, 2022, <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/what-is-corporation-overview/>.

44 Susi Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction Private companies and the nuclear weapon industry* (Utrecht, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, May 2019), https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_Producers-Report-FINAL.pdf

45 Kassenova, “The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation.”

46 Jean Folger, “What Is an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)?” Investopedia, July 18, 2022, <https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/13/what-is-non-government-organization.asp>.

47 Folger, “What Is an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)?”

48 Andrew Blum, Victor Asal, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Non-State Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *International Studies Review* 7, (March 2005): 133–137, <https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/7/1/133/1797342>

49 “History,” Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, accessed July 24, 2022, <https://www.opcw.org/about-us/history>.

50 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “History.”

51 Purdue, *Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War*.

52 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “History.”

53 Gerard Fitzgerald, “Chemical warfare and medical response during World War I,” *Am J Public Health* 98 no.4 (April 2008):611-625, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2007.

54 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “History.”

55 “1925 Geneva Protocol,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 25, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/>



Specialist uses a grapple hook to clear a wire obstacle during U.S. Army Europe Expert Field Medical Badge Combat Testing at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany on March 29, 2019

Credit: OPCW

prohibit the use of WMDs against non-ratifying countries, nor did it include any retaliations for countries who did use it. Hence, countries could continue to develop and store them.⁵⁶

Many developed countries spent considerable resources developing weapons of mass destruction in the 1920s. All the major powers involved in World War II foresaw that full-scale chemical warfare would occur. For this reason, to complement the Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 was created. The BWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons and requires their destruction.⁵⁷ With 184 members, the Biological Weapons Convention is an important part of the international community's fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, setting strict standards for biological weapons. The BWC itself is relatively short, consisting of only 15 articles.⁵⁸ Over the years, it has been supplemented by additional agreements. To ensure it remains practical despite changes in science and technology,

member states meet about every five years.⁵⁹

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament also adopted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on April 29, 1997. Each member state of this Convention agrees not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons or to transfer those weapons to anyone, directly or indirectly.⁶⁰ Like the BWC, the convention treats all countries equally, including major ones. Together with the CWC, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established.⁶¹ It is located in the Hague, Netherlands, and is made up of 189 countries.⁶² Some of the OPCW's primary goals are to ensure the implementation of the CWC, protect chemical weapons, and encourage international cooperation.⁶³

In the field of nuclear weapons, many treaties have been established to prevent nuclear proliferation. These include the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and The Seabed Arms Controls Treaty of 1972, which ban the stationing of WMDs in outer

⁵⁶ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "History."

⁵⁷ "Biological Weapons Convention," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 31, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/>.

⁵⁸ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Biological Weapons Convention."

⁵⁹ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Biological Weapons Convention."

⁶⁰ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Chemical Weapons Convention* (The Hague: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 2020), https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CWC/CWC_en.pdf

⁶¹ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Chemical Weapons Convention*.

⁶² "Weapons of Mass Destruction," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 31, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/>.

⁶³ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Weapons of Mass Destruction."

space and the ocean, respectively.⁶⁴ Another remarkable effort related to nuclear weapons was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1975. The IAEA is the intergovernmental platform for scientific and technical collaboration in the nuclear area.⁶⁵ The centerpiece of international measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.⁶⁶ It prevents nuclear proliferation and promotes nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁶⁷ Lastly, the most recent effort to create a nuclear-weapon-free world is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on January 22, 2021.⁶⁸

Some successful agreements sought to diminish specific categories of nuclear weapons. Some examples are the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.⁶⁹ The efforts have also been supported by reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals by major powers like Russia, the United States, the UK, and France.

Finally, one of the most important measures taken regarding weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors is resolution 1540 from 2004. In this resolution, the Security Council resolved that all States shall withhold from supporting non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, transfer or use WMD.⁷⁰ The resolution demands all States implement suitable laws to this effect and other measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery to

non-State actors.⁷¹

In cooperation with the 1540 Committee and other regional organizations, the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) assists the Member States in implementing the resolution. Over 170 States, 50 organizations, and UN entities have participated.⁷² Although all the mentioned treaties represent the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, their implementation currently faces many challenges, from legal disagreement to non-compliance. DISEC delegates are tasked with finding new ways to strengthen the existing treaties and ensure the peaceful use of current and future life sciences.

Use of Chemical Weapons by the Islamic State

The Islamic State is a terrorist group founded in 1999 that follows the Salafi jihadist sect of Sunni Islam.⁷³ Beginning June 25, 2015, the Islamic State launched several bombs on Kurdish civilians in an attack that lasted around three days in northeastern Syria.⁷⁴ Soldiers exposed to the substance reportedly suffered from nausea and burns.⁷⁵ It was later confirmed that samples from the attack site contained a small amount of mustard agent.⁷⁶ This was not the first time that the Islamic State used chemical weapons; however, never before had a non-state actor been able to combine a chemical agent with a projectile delivery system.⁷⁷

Since the earliest incident in 2014, at least 71 allegations of the Islamic State using chemical weapons have been registered by

64 Mark Rosen, "Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones" *Naval War College Review* 49, no.4 (1996): 44-61, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44638713>.

65 "Official Web Site of the IAEA," International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed July 25, 2022, <https://www.iaea.org/>.

66 "The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty," International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed July 25, 2022, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty>

67 International Atomic Energy Agency, "The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

68 "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 25, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/>.

69 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons."

70 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons."

71 "UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed July 31, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.

72 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)."

73 "Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State," Wilson Center, last modified October 28, 2019, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state>; "The Islamic State," Mapping Militant Organizations Stanford University, last modified April 2021, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state>.

74 Sylvia Westall and Tom Perry, "Islamic State kills at least 145 civilians in Syria's Kobani," *Reuters*, June 26, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBNOP60UY20150626>

75 Colum Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 9 (October 2017): 19-23, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss9-21.pdf.

76 United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Government, 'Islamic State' Known to Have Used Gas in Syria, Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Head Tells Security Council," press release, November 7, 2017, <https://press.un.org/en/2017/sc13060.doc.htm>.

77 Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," 19-23.

Conflict Monitor.⁷⁸ Most involved mustard gas or chlorine, loaded into mortar shells or placed in barrels and detonated in suicide attacks. The worst incident occurred in March 2016 near the Kurdish town of Taza Khurmatu, south of Kirkuk, where 600–1,000 people were injured.⁷⁹ In addition to the physical damage, the attacks generated fear across Kurdish towns that, years earlier, had been victims of Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons. In March 1988, bombs filled with deadly gasses killed at least 3,000 people in Halabja, the most lethal chemical attack ever conducted against civilians.⁸⁰

During Saddam’s tenure in the 1980s, the manufacturing center for Iraqi weapons was an industrial complex called the Muthanna Establishment. Iraqi scientists supervised the production of at least four kinds of weapons used in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi chemical bombs were used to kill injuring over 50,000 Iranians.⁸¹ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi showed interest in chemical weapons in 1999 and first established a jihadist training camp in Afghanistan, where his supporters

tested the use of toxins. While the intent to develop chemical weapons had always existed, a lack of security of territorial control, access to laboratory equipment, and unlimited chemical antecedents allowed the Islamic State to do so.⁸² There have been beliefs that the Islamic State could produce weapons from existing stockpiles of the former Syrian-Iraqi government.⁸³ Many chemical weapons munitions were stored in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Poor government documentation means that many remained untraceable after the UN Special Commission process to reconcile the number of agents and weapons made with what was consumed and remained. Even a one percent margin of error would result in thousands of munitions being missed.⁸⁴ The OPCW removed the last of Syria’s declared chemical weapons from the country in June 2014.⁸⁵ However, the absence of any public process to corroborate Syria’s claims has led to speculation that Syria may have kept chemical weapons capabilities to some extent.

The development of chemical weapons by the Islamic State

78 Joanna Vickers, “Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says,” *IHS Markit*, June 13, 2017, https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/aerospace-defense-security-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-capability-degraded-ihsmar.

79 Joby Warrick, “ISIS planned chemical attacks in Europe, new details on weapons program reveal,” *The Washington Post*, July 11, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/11/isis-chemical-biological-weapons/>.

80 Warrick, “ISIS planned chemical attacks in Europe, new details on weapons program reveal.”

81 Warrick, “ISIS planned chemical attacks in Europe, new details on weapons program reveal.”

82 Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts,” 19-23.

83 Warrick, “ISIS planned chemical attacks in Europe, new details on weapons program reveal.”

84 Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts,” 19-23.

85 United Nations News, “Removal of Syria’s chemical weapons material complete, announces OPCW-UN mission,” news release, June 23, 2014, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/06/471392-removal-syrias-chemical-weapons-material-complete-announces-opcw-un-mission>.



Members of the Iraqi counter-terrorism force move in a single file around buildings during military training in Mosul, Iraq on April 5, 2018

Credit: Pfc. Anthony Zendejas

in Iraq and Syria can be analyzed in three stages. During the first stage, between June 2014 and June 2015, they tested techniques for including available industrial chemicals from stocks captured as a part of the group's territorial expansion. These attacks were executed using rudimentary delivery mechanisms, like adding a chemical to the roadside.⁸⁶

According to a UN Security Council report, the Islamic State used Iraqi prisoners to test chemical and biological weapons during this phase.⁸⁷ According to the report, many prisoners died due to the testing.⁸⁸ Investigators have reviewed reports of prisoners being exposed to thallium and nicotine, which is deadly at high doses.⁸⁹ UN officials are also exploring Islamic actions to weaponize chlorine and produce sulfur mustard, also known as mustard gas. This dangerous gas was used to kill and injure thousands during World War I.⁹⁰

Later, the leaders of the Islamic State recruited scientists and engineers to produce sulfur mustard using Mosul's laboratories. Some Iraqi experts who went to work for the state later claimed they were forced to take the jobs because they had no other way to earn their living.⁹¹ In the second stage, from July 2015 to January 2017, the group obtained an improved capability in producing a sulfur mustard agent with the means of delivering it using projectiles.⁹² The attacks of June 2015 confirmed the effort was partially successful. The Islamic State made homemade sulfur mustard of low quality and dispersed it using rockets or artillery. During this period, chemical attacks were executed simultaneously across the Caliphate. This indicated the existence of multiple operational

units with the necessary expertise.⁹³

The third and final stage started with the Islamic State's alleged retirement from its chemical weapons development efforts after the loss of Mosul in July 2017. Additionally, by the end of 2016, the Islamic State's known chemical weapons facilities had been eliminated, and many of its workers were killed or arrested.⁹⁴ The liberation of Mosul temporarily concluded the program's active phase. However, the chemical attack in Douma, Syria, on April 7, 2018, proved that the group's ambitions for chemical and biological weapons have not ended.⁹⁵

Current Status

Private Companies and The Weapons of Mass Destruction Industry

Today, countries have access to a wide range of knowledge, materials, and capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction more than ever before.⁹⁶ The techniques involved in WMD development, such as manipulating radioactive atoms, and research on chemical toxins and biological organisms, have a vital role in society and the economy.⁹⁷ Thus, the production and access to WMD are shaped primarily by the private sector. Private companies produce and manage nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment. In addition, governments have boosted public-private associations in some of the most sensitive technology areas to take advantage

86 Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," 19-23.

87 Joby Warrick, "ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners, U.N. investigators find," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/isis-chemical-weapons-experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebf0-b42e-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html.

88 UN Security Council, Sixth report of the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, S/2021/419, (May 3, 2021), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/104/70/PDF/N2110470.pdf?OpenElement>

89 Warrick, "ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners, U.N. investigators find."

90 "Facts About Sulfur Mustard," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, last modified April 4, 2018, <https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/sulfurmustard/basics/facts.asp>.

91 Warrick, "ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners, U.N. investigators find."

92 Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," 19-23.

93 Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," 19-23.

94 Strack, "The Evolution of the Islamic State's Chemical Weapons Efforts," 19-23.

95 "OPCW Issues Fact-Finding Mission Report on Chemical Weapons Use Allegation in Douma, Syria, in 2018," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, accessed August 2, 2022, <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2019/03/opcw-issues-fact-finding-mission-report-chemical-weapons-use-allegation>.

96 Brian Finlay, "Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain," *Stimson Center*, February 18, 2009, <https://www.stimson.org/2009/minding-our-business-role-private-sector-managing-wmd-supply-chain/>.

97 Vladimir Pitschmann, "Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons," *Toxins (Basel)* 6, no.6 (June 2014): 1761-1784, doi: 10.3390/toxins6061761.



Signal cables are laid out at a nuclear test location on Yucca Flat, a major nuclear test region in the United States

Credit: Federal Government of the United States

of lower expenses and innovation.⁹⁸

Violent non-state actors can efficiently manipulate companies to obtain the necessary technologies to develop WMD.⁹⁹ There is a growing challenge to the nonproliferation control and governments' ability to prevent proliferation without the private sector's efforts.¹⁰⁰ This has led to an outbreak of new industry actors. Depending on their integrity, this could have deep implications for national and international security. Cases involving vulnerable companies that produce dual-use materials illustrate the incapacity of existing control measures to contain this growing threat.¹⁰¹ There is an urgent need to modernize global nonproliferation strategies, and private companies play a crucial role.¹⁰²

There are many reasons a company might decide to produce WMD. For some, the idea suits a business model based on delivering products designed to kill. For others, it is an

exciting challenge or an opportunity to earn huge amounts of money.¹⁰³ However, others might be unaware of their role in the supply chain. The intentional or unintentional collection of private entities supporting the activities of proliferators goes beyond those firms that work with nuclear, biological, or chemical agents. Many manufacturers are also involved in data security and other sectors that could directly apply to proliferation actions. For example, research from Stimson, a nonprofit think tank, states that Saddam Hussein took advantage of illicit networks to avoid the ban imposed on Iraq and acquire materials from other countries for use in illegal purposes.¹⁰⁴ Foreign trading and shipping companies are also essential for moving products.¹⁰⁵ These companies are used to avoid embargoes of illicit products. An embargo is an official ban on commercial activities that can prohibit the transit of commercial transport.¹⁰⁶ This can be avoided by falsifying documents or turning off identification systems.¹⁰⁷ Companies

98 Finlay, "Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain."

99 Togzhan Kassenova, "The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified March 4, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/04/exploitation-of-global-financial-systems-for-weapons-of-mass-destruction-wmd-proliferation-pub-81221>.

100 John Carlson, *Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament*, (Australian government Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008), <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/challenges-to-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-regime-and-implications-for-nuclear-disarmament>.

101 Finlay, "Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain."

102 Nate Olson, "The Need To Modernize The Nonproliferation Toolkit," *Trade Network Transparency: Adding Market Value To The Nonproliferation Agenda*, Stimson Center (2016): 4-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10997.4>.

103 Kassenova, "The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation."

104 Finlay, "Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain."

105 Kassenova, "The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation."

106 "Embargo," Merriam-Webster, accessed August 23, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/embargo>.

107 Kassenova, "The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation."

in these sectors could either contribute to the proliferation chain or become valuable partners in dismantling it.

By the 1990s, many political and economic forces joined in revolutionizing the global security system driving dual-use knowledge and tools into more hands. The end of the Cold War produced an unprecedented transfer of technologies from governments to private hands.¹⁰⁸ For instance, former Soviet biological weapons designers left their institutes to open legitimate biotechnology companies.¹⁰⁹ Given current political and economic realities, identifying the range of technologies that could be redirected to develop weapons is a big challenge. Regulating a growing number of private actors is one step toward proliferation prevention.¹¹⁰ However, it is not just a challenge of poor regulations. For private companies, complying with these regulations means making numerous adjustments that could harm their businesses. Inconsistent standards from country to country are also a part of the problem. Activities prohibited by one government are accepted by others. US regulations, for example, prevent biotechnology companies from using recombinant DNA technology to produce dangerous toxins. However, in some South Korean companies, such as Medy-Tox, this technology is used to operate legitimately under current South Korean law.¹¹¹ Terrorist groups or other non-state actors pursuing to build nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons can take advantage of this. Additionally, despite international calls for regulations and disarmament, new nuclear weapons are being developed in all nuclear-armed countries. Governments from France, the UK, and the US paid more than USD 100 billion to private companies for nuclear weapons production, development, and stockpiling in 2019.¹¹²

108 Finlay, “Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain.”

109 Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev and Dastan Yeleukenov, *Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future* (Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 1999), <http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/op1.pdf>.

110 Finlay, “Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain.”

111 Brian Finlay, “Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in Managing the WMD Supply Chain,” *Stimson Center*, February 18, 2009, <https://www.stimson.org/2009/minding-our-business-role-private-sector-managing-wmd-supply-chain/>.

112 Susi Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction: Private companies and the nuclear weapon industry* (PAX: Don’t Bank on the Bomb, 2019), https://www.nomorebombs.org/uploads/2/3/7/2/23729326/2019_producers-report-final.pdf.

113 Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction: Private companies and the nuclear weapon industry*.

114 Susi Snyder, *Perilous Profiteering: The companies building nuclear arsenals and their financial backers* (PAX, 2021), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmxc.cloudfront.net/ican/pages/2331/attachments/original/1637141262/2021_Perilous_Profitteering_Final.pdf?1637141262.

115 United Nations, Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (New York: United Nations, 2017), <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf>.

116 Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction: Private companies and the nuclear weapon industry*.

117 ICAN, *Squandered: 2021 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending* (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, June 2022), https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/2873/attachments/original/1655145777/Spending_Report_2022_web.pdf?1655145777.

118 ICAN, *Squandered: 2021 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending*.

Some contracts are awarded for long time frames. For example, a contract for a necessary component to launch U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is scheduled to last until 2075.¹¹³ Typically, most arrangements last five to ten years and are modified regularly to meet contingencies. On the other hand, some companies do not adhere to international regulations like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).¹¹⁴ Activities prohibited by the TPNW include producing required components, stockpiling, or building facilities to allow any stationing of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁵ This shows some companies’ evident disinterest in following international humanitarian law. Companies making weapons designed to inflict mass death violate the rules of war.¹¹⁶ These companies, and the contracts they accept, are part of the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons problem.

A modern example of this problem is Russia’s war with Ukraine and its threats to use nuclear weapons. Aggression of this kind against a country should have been impossible with existing regulations. Instead, nuclear weapons have allowed a nuclear-armed state to disregard international law. According to a report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “in 2021, the year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nine nuclear-armed states spent USD 82.4 billion on nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁷ That same year, the nuclear weapons business earned USD 30 billion in new contracts.¹¹⁸ This cycle did not prevent the war in Europe. Instead of spending billions on the WMD industry, all members of the international community are responsible for coming together to find an effective solution.

Cyberweapons: The New Weapon of Mass Destruction

So far, the term “weapons of mass destruction” has been used mainly for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. However, technology has emerged as a potentially devastating tool for cyberterrorism. In 2021, 4.9 billion people used the internet, which correlates to over two-thirds of the world’s population.¹¹⁹ As this number continues to grow, cyberspace becomes vital for everyday life. The internet hosts various political, economic, and social functions worldwide. Infrastructures supporting essential services such as transportation, electricity, healthcare, government defense, security, and financial markets are increasingly integrated with computers and other technologies.¹²⁰

These complex interdependencies make them more efficient and available. However, despite its many advantages, cyberspace has also brought new dangers. This dependency creates a dangerous situation for non-state actors to cause mass destruction by attacking the networks controlling these infrastructure components. For this reason, there has been a focus on cyber defense. Currently, cyberspace is considered within the military worldwide as a fifth arena, along with land, sea, air, and space, where military operations can be executed. These operations may be performed alone or as a supplement to traditional warfare.¹²¹

To understand the emergence of cyber warfare and the threat it poses to international security, it is crucial to analyze how cyber warfare first appeared. Just as the industrial revolution brought a fundamental change in warfare, the Information Age pursued a new strategic defense option.¹²² In their

119 “Topic: Internet Usage Worldwide,” Statista Research Department, last modified July 6, 2022, https://www.statista.com/topics/1145/internet-usage-worldwide/#topicHeader__wrapper.

120 Johan Sigholm, “Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations,” *Journal of Military Studies* 4, no. 1 (2013): 1-33, <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=F50E01E2F4F2D6C071226EAD0AB177DC?doi=10.1.1.1059.1546&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

121 Sigholm, “Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations,” 1-33.

122 Warren Chin, “Technology, war and the state: past, present and future,” *International Affairs* 95, no. 4 (July 2019): 765–783, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz106>. <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/4/765/5513164>

123 Merriam-Webster, “Weapon,” accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weapon>.

124 Davinder Kumar, “Cyber Weapons- The New Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Journal of the United Service Institution of India* 142, no. 591 (2013), <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/cyber-weapons-the-new-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>.

125 Ross Rustici, *Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field* (Army War College, 2011), <https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/Cyberweapons%20-%20Leveling%20the%20International%20Playing%20Field.pdf>.

126 Kumar, “Cyber Weapons- The New Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

127 Paulius Ilevičius, “Stuxnet Explained - the Worm That Went Nuclear,” NordVPN, last modified May 13, 2022, <https://nordvpn.com/blog/stuxnet-virus/#>:

128 Ilevičius, *Stuxnet Explained - the Worm That Went Nuclear*.

129 Davinder Kumar, *Cyber Weapons – The New Weapons of Mass Destruction* (United States Service Institution of India, March 2013), <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/cyber-weapons-the-new-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>

simplest form, weapons have evolved and are used to injure or destroy.¹²³ Similar to conventional weapons, cyber weapons are also evolving, but much faster. Cyber weapons can perform most of the strategic tasks that once required air superiority or nuclear capability.¹²⁴ Given the long-range speed and precision with which a cyber attack can be carried out, these weapons can be used for anything without endangering the attacker.¹²⁵

A significant cyber-terrorism attack can potentially cause a mass destruction event just as devastating as any other WMD. In most cases, the event may not directly cause death. Still, disabling or destroying an essential service would result in tragedy. However, there are ways in which a cyber attack can cause direct casualties, such as activating a nuclear plant breakdown or sabotaging an air traffic control service.¹²⁶ One example is Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that was the first virus to generate physical destruction.¹²⁷ It initially targeted Iran’s uranium facilities, but cyber attackers have adapted it for other targets, such as power plants. As a result, it thoroughly disabled Iran’s nuclear program.¹²⁸ This case demonstrates how attacks such as hacks or viruses induced by cyberterrorism can ultimately be detrimental to a state’s national security.

Beyond technical cyber vulnerabilities, another danger posed by cyberspace is cyber espionage. Leaks of stolen government information by state and non-state actors have a history of creating international tensions. Since not all cyber attacks are state-sponsored, non-state actors operating in particular countries can be critical to relationships between countries.¹²⁹ The type of global response to state versus non-state actors can vary dramatically. When a non-state actor attacks, the hackers can operate with individual or government-contracted

agendas instead of working directly with a government. For instance, the group Anonymous has claimed responsibility for several public web defacements, leaks of information, and other recent cyberattacks related to military affairs or national security. This group of non-state actors takes action against the government and private figures but is not directly associated with any region in the international community.¹³⁰

The wide range of issues mentioned above makes cyber weapons unique. Delegates should evaluate the role of cyber weapons when addressing the issue of preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMD. A review of the growing evolution of cyber weapons as WMDs will soon be necessary. A fundamental element in managing this issue is closely examining these weapons' development and their destructive potential in the physical world. Additionally, understanding the distinction between the different actors in cyber warfare is imperative to respond effectively. Delegates are encouraged to explore the difficulties of preventing cyber attacks by non-state actors to develop solutions adapted to the most modern threats.

Sustainable Development Goals

In 2015, the UN and its member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.¹³¹ This Agenda describes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are a universal call for all member states to tackle global issues that may interfere with the sustainable development of a peaceful and prosperous world.¹³²

These objectives make it critical for delegates to keep the SDGs at the front of their proposed solutions and during debate. Armed violence continues to interfere in the worldwide path toward peace and sustainable development. Illegal trafficking of weapons and their components facilitates access to WMD by terrorists and other violent non-state actors.

¹³⁰ Johan Sigholm, "Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations," *Journal of Military Studies* 4, no. 1 (November 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1515/jms-2016-0184>

¹³¹ "Sustainable Development Goals: United Nations Development Programme," United Nations Development Programme, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals>.

¹³² UNDP, "Sustainable Development Goals: United Nations Development Programme."

¹³³ "Disarmament and Sustainable Development," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/sustainable-development/>.

¹³⁴ "Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 3 Good Health and Well-Being," United Nations Development Programme, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals#good-health>.

¹³⁵ "Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH," United Nations Development Programme, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals#decent-work-and-economic-growth>.

Additionally, many companies involved in the WMD industry are, on one side, trying to present themselves as sustainable, socially responsible actors; on the other, producing weapons designed to kill and leave contaminating residues for years. This indicates that companies should not only comply with legislation in the countries where they operate but also with widely supported international conventions that recognize sustainability problems.

The proliferation of WMD has massive impacts on many aspects of human life and the environment, relating to numerous SDGs. For instance, according to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), armed violence is one of the leading causes of early death.¹³³ SDG 3: Good Health and Wellbeing aims to "substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water, and soil pollution and contamination."¹³⁴ Disarmament can decrease the impact of conflict on human health. This principle calls for states to continue the fight against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to prevent their detrimental consequences.

Another important aspect is related to decent work. Excess military spending on the WMD industry damages economic development and produces political and social consequences. SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth aims to "achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men" and "eradicate forced labor, end modern slavery and human trafficking, and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, including recruitment and use of child soldiers."¹³⁵ Members of the international community can reduce their military budgets and promote the creation of employment. Additionally, preventing the proliferation of weapons can counter the recruitment of children and drive young men and women away from violent non-state actors.

The production of necessary components to build nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapons creates a risk of storage exploding. These explosions could be fatal and lead to death, economic chaos, and destruction. Among the targets of SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities is the goal to “significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected...caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations.”¹³⁶ This aids in the recovery effort following the destruction of WMD and promotes the rights of developing regions. Arms regulations can increase regional safety by impeding WMD’s uncontrolled proliferation and misuse. Two other very important SDGs to consider are goals 14 and 15, which promote the restoration and conservation of ocean and land ecosystems. Testing from WMD contaminates the environment, which can have catastrophic environmental consequences if not addressed.¹³⁷

The goal of most concern for DISEC is SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.¹³⁸ Disarmament and non-proliferation are crucial in preventing conflict and maintaining peace. Specific targets identify how disarmament is essential to achieve a peaceful world. For example, one target states: “significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime.”¹³⁹ This SDG promotes military transparency, confidence, and stability at the regional level, reducing the military burden on societies. Lastly, none of the previous goals would be possible without mobilizing sufficient resources to support disarmament. This is why SDG 17, Partnerships for the Goals, is very important and should always be considered when addressing the issue.¹⁴⁰

Bloc Analysis

The following bloc positions are divided by various countries’ strength of defense against the threat posed by WMD according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Nuclear Security Index (NS), and Global Health Security Index (GHS). The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a nonprofit organization that works to reduce the threat posed by WMD, specifically nuclear and biological.¹⁴¹

The GHS Index is a project directed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) together with the Johns Hopkins Center.¹⁴² It assesses 95 countries’ ability to prevent and manage critical biological threats, with scores divided into different categories.¹⁴³ Regarding the threat posed by non-state actors, the risk category is the most important to consider. It evaluates the political and security risks and the vulnerability to biological threats.¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, the NTI Index is a globally recognized review of nuclear security conditions in many countries worldwide.¹⁴⁵ It considers five different categories of factors that influence a country’s nuclear security needs.¹⁴⁶ These factors are Quantities and Sites, Security and Control Measures, Global Norms, Domestic Commitments and Capacity, and Risk Environment. For the issue of preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMD, the category considered is Risk Environment. According to the NTI, this category “includes contextual factors, such as political stability, effective governance, corruption, and illicit activities by non-state actors that can affect a country’s ability to implement

136 “TARGET 11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations,” Indicators Report, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://indicators.report/targets/11-5/>.

137 “SDG 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development and SDG 15: Protect, Restore and Promote Sustainable Use of Terrestrial Ecosystems, Sustainably Manage Forests, Combat Desertification, and Halt and Reverse Land Degradation and Halt Biodiversity Loss,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/sustainable-development-goals/sdg14-and-15.html>.

138 “Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals#peace-justice-and-strong-institutions>.

139 UNDP, “Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.”

140 “Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 17 Partnerships for the Goals,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals#partnerships-for-the-goals>.

141 “NTI,” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified August 11, 2022, <https://www.nti.org/>.

142 “Global Health Security Index,” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified March 28, 2022, <https://www.nti.org/about/programs-projects/project/global-health-security-index/>.

143 “About the GHS Index,” GHS Index, last modified December 8, 2021, <https://www.ghsindex.org/about/>.

144 GHS Index, “About the GHS Index.”

145 “The 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index,” NTI Nuclear Security Index, last modified April 20, 2022, <https://www.ntiindex.org/>.

146 “About the Index,” NTI Nuclear Security Index, last modified July 20, 2020, <https://www.ntiindex.org/about-the-nti-index/>.

effective security.”¹⁴⁷ Each country is scored from 0 to 100, where 100 is the best score meaning the lower risk. The Risk environment category scores are calculated as the weighted sum of the indicator scores within that category, including the contextual factors mentioned above. A score is considered high between 67 and 100, moderate between 34 and 66, and low between 0 and 33.¹⁴⁸

It is important to remember that the index provides an international ranking of states based on their readiness to deal with the effects of WMD. Delegates will find that the NTI Security indexes will help determine their blocs and their countries’ policies.

Countries with High Scores in the Risk Environment Ranking

This bloc consists of countries that scored highly on the Risk Environment category of the Nuclear and Global Health Security Indexes. These countries have a strong defense against nuclear and biological threats. They are considered to have the resources to address their effects. For example, some of these countries are Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Japan, United Kingdom, Belgium, Singapore, New Zealand, Iceland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Barbados, Austria, Finland, Seychelles, and Denmark.¹⁴⁹

Within this block are countries with different levels of access to WMD by the government. For instance, the United Kingdom is one of the nine nuclear states regarding nuclear weapons. At the same time, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark have less than one kilogram or no usable atomic materials. However, these countries have similar political principles that allow them to have a high quality of life, economic stability, and advanced technological infrastructure. For this reason, countries in this bloc have a low rate of illicit activities by non-state actors and corruption.

Countries with Moderate Scores in the Risk Environment Ranking

According to their NTI Nuclear and Global Security

147 NTI Nuclear Security Index, “About the Index.”

148 NTI Nuclear Security Index, “About the Index.”

149 NTI Nuclear Security Index, “The 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index.”

150 NTI Nuclear Security Index, “The 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index.”

151 NTI Nuclear Security Index, “The 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index.”

Index, this bloc consists of countries with an average risk environment ranking. These countries usually have moderate levels of defense against nuclear or biological threats, meaning that their resources to deal with such attacks are often but not always sufficient. A few of the countries in this bloc include France, the United States, South Africa, Belarus, Israel, China, Italy, India, Mauritius, United Arab Emirates, Spain, Poland, Jamaica, Kuwait, Croatia, Romania, Argentina, Egypt, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Sri Lanka, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil.¹⁵⁰

In some cases, for these countries, one or two index factors, such as political stability or effective governance, are high, with low scores for the other factors, like the illicit activities by non-state actors weighing down the overall score. Another important factor to consider is the level of access to WMD. Countries such as France and the United States may have economic stability, strong infrastructure, and various resources but have a history of possessing large stockpiles of NBC weapons. This increases their exposure to a mass destruction attack by non-state actors.

Countries with Low Scores in the Risk Environment Ranking

This bloc consists of countries that globally rank in the lowest positions in the risk environment category. These countries are the most exposed to possible mass casualties attacks or the least prepared for defense. Some examples of countries in this bloc are Pakistan, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Central African Republic, Venezuela, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Haiti, Congo, and Guinea.¹⁵¹

These countries also tend to be less developed compared to others with higher scores on the index. In many of these countries, WMD is not seen as a priority, and efforts are focused more on fundamental issues such as hunger and poverty. However, in others, such as Russia and North Korea WMDs pose a critical threat. Still, the low scores may be due to other political and economic factors responsible for the lack of the necessary infrastructure to ensure a secure environment against WMD.

Committee Mission

The issue of preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMD is multifaceted. It affects every country across the global community. Thus, delegates should consider different aspects to find sustainable and efficient solutions. This issue is one of complex elements, including the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons, the role of private companies in the WMD industry, and the use of WMD by terrorist groups.

The problems that derive from violent non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, are incredibly diverse. From psychological and medical implications to disarmament, delegates must understand the extent of terrorism on which DISEC focuses.¹⁵² Although it is essential to recognize those impacted by terrorism, the first committee does not focus on humanitarian aid. As DISEC, member states are responsible for “disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that affect the international community” within the scope of the UN charter.¹⁵³ It is important to remember that DISEC may not establish international law. However, it may come up with practical suggestions on how to strengthen previously passed biological, chemical, and nuclear non-proliferation treaties specifically for the issue of preventing their use by non-state actors.¹⁵⁴

In the same way, DISEC may not use military force to provide peace. Thus, delegates must address all the challenges this topic presents from a diplomatic and disarmament perspective. They should not focus on the use of WMD by states or any government body. Instead, they need to determine how countries can best build up their security infrastructure and prevent the proliferation of WMD. This background guide should not limit delegates’ research to the specific subtopics discussed. Instead, it is meant to encourage research as much as possible before the committee.¹⁵⁵

152 “Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf>.

153 “Disarmament and International Security (First Committee),” United Nations General Assembly, accessed August 7, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>.

154 United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations, “Disarmament and International Security.”

155 United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations, “Disarmament and International Security.”



DISEC

NHSMUN 2023



TOPIC B: THE ETHICS OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

Photo Credit: Oleksandr Perevoznyk

Introduction

There are an estimated 770 million surveillance cameras installed in over 176 countries around the world.¹ Surveillance is a broad term as it may refer to installing cameras in homes to protect property or governments tracking citizens' calls and text messages. The main purpose of surveillance is to improve security and defense mechanisms globally. It is important to note that surveillance is a critical defense measure of the 21st century and has become vital to prevent potential security risks. As technology becomes more advanced, questions have been raised about limiting certain types of surveillance.

Surveillance ethics is an intensely debated issue globally. Questions arise about how surveillance should work, what policies promote privacy and security, and how collected data is used.² Countries and institutions around the world have different approaches and policies on surveillance. China's federal government requires that surveys by private agencies be submitted to a government database. Under China's current president, surveillance significantly expanded to include records of every person, data on spending habits, internet tracking, and even the locations of parked cars.³ On the other hand, countries like Senegal have no limitations on surveillance or how information is used. There is no national regulation on what information can be collected, which is dangerous as sensitive information is left in the trust of private corporations.⁴

Every defense system currently has some surveillance or data collection element. The accessibility of surveillance technology continues to be heavily debated, which is where there is a divide in resources, funding allocation, and how information is shared. The debate surrounding surveillance ethics has intensified over the last couple of decades as technology has rapidly changed. The most recent surge of debate regarding surveillance ethics has regarded the COVID-19 pandemic, sharing information, resources, and tracking systems. These topics continue to be debated, and these systems are still relevant with the new monkeypox outbreak.

The obstacles to solving the issue come from the various approaches governments take to privacy and information security. Countries are opposed to sharing information regarding public health data, environmental research, and military data. There is a lack of transparency in many organizations, and countries are incredibly weary of who gets access to their research and findings. This topic is currently at the forefront of global security and needs to be approached with the utmost attention and delicacy.

History and Description of the Issue

Defining Surveillance

Technological, economic, and military advancements of the past five decades have increased the capabilities and access to surveillance. At least 75 countries currently use artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for surveillance. However, conversations for policies that regulate and enforce specific uses of these technologies have begun. This includes who is allowed to use them, how surveillance technology is used, and how the data collected can be used.⁵ Due to the increased use of surveillance, there is a lot of disagreement amongst the international community regarding regulations and what constitutes surveillance. It is generally accepted that surveillance is the act of observing to gather evidence, most typically used by those enforcing laws and trying to prevent

1 Matthew Keegan, "The Top 10 Most Surveilled Cities in the World," *US News*, August 14, 2020, <https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-08-14/the-top-10-most-surveilled-cities-in-the-world>.

2 Maša Galič, "Bentham, Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon to Participation," *Philosophy & Technology* 30 (2017): 9–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0219-1>.

3 Xiao Qiang, "The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi's Surveillance State," *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1 (January 2019): 53–67, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-road-to-digital-unfreedom-president-xis-surveillance-state/>.

4 Ababacar Diop, "Senegal," Global Information Society Watch, accessed June 14, 2022, <https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/senegal>.

5 "Surveillance," Cambridge English Dictionary, accessed June 20, 2022, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/surveillance>.



Traffic cameras like this one in the United Kingdom are one example of surveillance technology

Credit: Alex McGregor

crime.⁶ The debate begins when talking about the power to hold and distribute this information, especially when it comes to those of a foreign entity. A clear definition is essential for setting proper legal boundaries for issues such as drone war crimes, the collection and distribution of data, and how surveillance can protect citizens.⁷

Surveillance technology takes a variety of forms, which the AI Global Surveillance Index (AIGS) breaks into four categories: smart/safe city platforms, facial recognition systems, smart policing, and social media surveillance.⁸ Smart/safe city platforms are used by 64 countries and include technologies such as traffic cameras. These help public safety organizations leverage data and videos to enforce laws and increase citizen accountability. Facial recognition systems are used by 78 countries and are one of the most controversial systems. Most federal bureaus and even private organizations have access to AI software, which can identify a person from just a photo or image. Smart policing is used by 69 countries and includes enhanced surveillance or police body cameras which help increase the efficiency and credibility of law enforcement.

6 Cambridge English Dictionary, "Surveillance."

7 Cambridge English Dictionary, "Surveillance."

8 Kaan Sahin, "The West, China, and AI Surveillance," Atlantic Council, December 18, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/the-west-china-and-ai-surveillance/>.

9 Kaan Sahin, "The West, China, and AI Surveillance."

10 Steven Feldstein, "AI & Big Data Global Surveillance Index (2022 Updated)," Mendeley Data, June 06, 2022, <https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/gjhf5y4xjp>.

11 Omar Costilla-Reyes, "Analysis of Spatio-Temporal Representations for Robust Footstep Recognition with Deep Residual Neural Networks," *Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers* 42, no. 2 (February 2019): 285-296, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2018.2799847>.

Finally, social media surveillance is used by 38 countries, which allows countries to monitor and filter the content displayed and posted online.⁹

AI technology is constantly changing and evolving, so these classifications are becoming outdated. For example, face recognition has gone beyond its current scope to include voice and gait recognition, demonstrating the need for an inclusive definition that accounts for the ever-evolving nature of surveillance technology.¹⁰ Gait recognition involves analyzing people's walks and behavior via cameras or floor sensors. A study on this was piloted at the University of Manchester, where researchers used data from 20 thousand footsteps of 124 people and could identify people with a 99 percent accuracy rate.¹¹

The UN's understanding and definition of surveillance are essential to the debate. This allows the issue to be analyzed for current precedents, what aspects need clarification, and potential loopholes which can be abused. For example, various UN documents state that information can be released

and published to the general public on a need-to-know basis, but there is no clear jurisdiction as to what is considered necessary.¹² While these distinctions are necessary and valid, a more precise definition of this basis would maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of information data handling. Many scholars and politicians disagree on how surveillance should be used and disseminated. This difference comes from various understandings of security but a differing moral ground.

The UN promotes international growth and progress, especially in promoting global security. Surveillance can be used to achieve this goal, where surveillance resources are shared across all countries. It will be important that surveillance laws are used only under necessary situations while upholding the fundamental rights that remain relevant in the digital age.¹³ Institutions and actors can be incentivized to share surveillance devices and technology. Creating transparency policies can help strengthen the focus on releasing dangerous information while promoting multilateral engagement.¹⁴ Whether we use surveillance to monitor places with active war, track the outbreak of disease, or watch the well-being of local persons, surveillance technology has become a tool that can promote global peace.¹⁵

The international community stands to benefit greatly from cooperation and collaboration. Regional and state issues have a large and direct impact on the safety of the international community. This is why transparency serves such an important role in global security. Countries often do not agree on the same approach because of differing ideologies that involve disagreements on moral standards regarding privacy.¹⁶ A lack of agreement on an approach can lead to contradiction and even more conflict. Creating universal standards eliminates the possibility of this happening and sets the standard for each

state, regardless of its political, economic, or social standing.

Understanding, and practicing surveillance and security at such a high level is complex without direction.¹⁷ Global security surveillance relies on the intersection between security and globalization. The most effective programs involve coordination between public and private law enforcement, security providers, and intelligence services across national borders. This allows surveillance agents to counteract threats in a way that follows pre-determined regulations agreed upon by the international community.¹⁸ However, this is difficult to achieve when agencies have differing policies, so a universal agreement is essential for addressing how surveillance is used.

Evolution of Surveillance Technology

Understanding how surveillance technology has changed over time is crucial when discussing current and future policies. Due to the rise and growth of technology, surveillance is a newer issue creating extensive gray areas for scholars, policymakers, and everyday citizens.

The origins of global surveillance can be traced back to 1971 with the creation of ECHELON, the first global surveillance network. ECHELON was an agreement operated by the United States and aided by the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The purpose of this program was to monitor international diplomatic and military communications during the Cold War.¹⁹ Although there is little verified evidence, the agreement was to utilize massive ground-based radio antennas to intercept satellite transmissions containing millions of digital communication information. It then relied on its content-sensitive dictionaries of keywords and phrases to scour the communications for relevant information. However, even after the end of the Cold War, this monitoring system continued, eventually evolving

12 "General Assembly Backs Right to Privacy in Digital Age," UN News, December 19, 2013, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/12/458232-general-assembly-backs-right-privacy-digital-age>.

13 Wafa Ben-Hassine, "Government Policy for the Internet Must Be Rights-Based and User-Centred," United Nations, Accessed June 26, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/government-policy-internet-must-be-rights-based-and-user-centred>.

14 Camino Kavanagh, "New Tech, New Threats, and New Governance Challenges: An Opportunity to Craft Smarter Responses?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 28, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/28/new-tech-new-threats-and-new-governance-challenges-opportunity-to-craft-smarter-responses-pub-79736>.

15 Wafa Ben-Hassine, "Government Policy for the Internet Must Be Rights-Based and User-Centred."

16 Wafa Ben-Hassine, "Government Policy for the Internet Must Be Rights-Based and User-Centred."

17 Gary T. Marx, "Surveillance Studies," *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* 23, no. 2 (2015): 733-741, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.64025-4>.

18 Marx, "Surveillance Studies," 733-741.

19 "Texts Adopted," European Parliament, September 5, 2001, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-5-2001-0440_EN.html.



ECHELON Field Station 81, where vast amounts of surveillance data is collected and processed

Credit: Christian M.

into a global monitoring system.²⁰ It is essential to note this evolution was not official because ECHELON did not exist to the public. Although the program showed how surveillance could benefit state security, espionage concerns have emerged in recent years and emphasized the importance of regulations for global security campaigns.²¹

Surveillance has greatly developed in the last two decades, and the recent addition of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has catalyzed this growth and completely changed monitoring technology. AI is a combination of programming and engineering that is implemented into computers to create programs and analyze information. It mimics human understanding and interactions, thus impacting how surveillance works and what triggers surveillance policies.²² Technology has made it incredibly easy to find and act on information, and the major parties controlling these sources have access to an incredible amount of power. This raises questions regarding the limits on when, where, and how this information can and should be used. AI must be very closely analyzed by the government. Autocratic and semi-autocratic countries are more prone to misuse AI

surveillance than governments in liberal democracies.²³ Some autocratic governments—for example, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—have mishandled AI technology for mass surveillance. Other governments with poor human rights records exploit AI surveillance in more limited ways to reinforce oppressive regimes. However, all political contexts risk unlawfully exploiting AI surveillance technology to obtain certain political objectives.²⁴ Laws and regulations exist to circumvent the unfair use of this information, but there is often a lack of transparency in handling this information.

Surveillance technology has typically been helpful to governments and a way to create social and ethical responsibility for those in power. Until recently, there was no debate regarding the ethics of surveillance or its limits, primarily because many did not see its dangers.²⁵ However, the idea of safety is constantly changing and has a different meaning for everyone. Safety is continually changing because as society evolves, every population faces more threats. With innovations in technology, new engineering, and even new biological weapons, the idea of safety has evolved, and it must

20 European Parliament, “Texts Adopted.”

21 Martin Asser, “Big Brother without a Cause?” BBC News, July 06, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/820758.stm>.

22 Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847>.

23 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance.”

24 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance.”

25 Kevin Macnish, “Surveillance Ethics,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed July 1, 2022, <https://iep.utm.edu/surv-eth/>.

cover a larger scope of issues.²⁶ The moral debate about how far surveillance should go is still ongoing.

The biggest argument against surveillance technology is privacy, which is the idea that every individual has the right to their thoughts and actions. Additionally, if not harming others, there is no need for this information to be discussed or disclosed. This begins the larger conversation surrounding legal precedent of privacy and what rights fall into this privilege.²⁷ Early discussions about the legality of privacy took place in the United States, such as with Warren and Brandeis' *The Right to Privacy*. This book is generally taken as the first attempt to define the concept of privacy, where the authors claim it is the "right to be let alone."²⁸ Technological developments then gave rise to landmark legal cases, such as *Eisenstadt v. Baird* (1972) in the US. This case established that the right to privacy involved the right to make important choices without government intervention, drawing a connection between privacy and autonomy.²⁹ Other legal proceedings that explicitly protect the right to privacy include Articles 16 and 21 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the European Union Data Protection Directive, among many others.³⁰ These proceedings beg the larger question of what privacy is and who is entitled to it.

While surveillance policies are often subject to the discretion of each country, protecting human rights and creating accountability should be done internationally. Exploring policies that effectively maintain long-standing peace, prevent abuse of information, and prevent tensions is beneficial.

Usage of Collected Data

Information collected from surveillance, whether from drones or internet monitoring systems, is used for various purposes by different companies and parties. The information collected is of increased interest to researchers and companies buying

data.

Data collected is often used for improving public health initiatives. The National Library of Medicine published the general principles of data collection and how it impacts care for patients with hemophilia. The components of public health surveillance are focused on data collection and regular analysis of the data that comes in with every system and demographic.³¹ Data collection ranges from socioeconomic living conditions to key information on health standards of a certain area, whether it be disease complications or mortality.³² It is of valid concern to think this has no relation to the discretion of the mandate of the DISEC committee. However, this example shows how collected data can positively impact society. If this information falls into the wrong hands and is distributed for unethical monetary incentives, the international community would be at risk.³³ There is a new debate surrounding how this collected information should be monitored and stored.

Not all collected data is a threat to safety; many insights based on surveillance data lead to positive societal contributions. Collected data is used in environmental projects. Drones can be used to gather information and test different ecosystems for a variety of contaminants or animals. One of the most influential and effective forms of the collection was the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.³⁴ Surveillance technology was used to assess and approximate the damage done to specific environments within the water and even take surveys of local and Indigenous communities who faced the repercussions and had contamination to their resources and land.

The purposes, as mentioned earlier, of data collection are overwhelmingly positive. They mutually benefit all involved parties, and the reasoning and data from these projects can be an asset to future causes. The conflict begins if collected information is harmful or holds a sort of political or economic gain. Examples include the location of nuclear weapons,

²⁶ Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

²⁷ Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

²⁸ Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

²⁹ Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

³⁰ "International Standards," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-privacy/international-standards>.

³¹ Michael Soucie, "Public health surveillance and data collection: general principles and impact on hemophilia care," *Hematology* 17, no. 1 (2012): s144-s146, <https://doi.org/10.1179/102453312X13336169156537>.

³² Soucie, "Public health surveillance and data collection."

³³ Soucie, "Public health surveillance and data collection."

³⁴ Monica Wilson, "In the air and on the water: Technology used to investigate oil spills," Sea Grant Programs of the Gulf of Mexico, September 2019, <https://masgc.org/oilscience/oil-science-tech-air-water.pdf>.



This remote controlled robot is part of a fleet of drones that test for chemical contaminants in the UK

Credit: MOD

the layout of different governmental organizations, or data relating to certain people and entities that can be enemies of the state.³⁵ Constantly tracking and surveillance systems are used to keep tabs on people that are important to the country. However, concerns arise over who should have access to this information and if there are any situations in which private information should be made public.³⁶ Privacy and its definition vary by country, so international mandates must be created to have a baseline and level of expected discretion. Article 12 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights expressly states that all are expected to have some level of privacy and that they should be protected against an attack on this personal liberty.³⁷ However, implementing this ruling into policies regarding surveillance has been lengthy.

A recent example is unpublished information regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries were accused of hiding information for months, possibly worsening the disease. Several sources say that Chinese authorities knew about the outbreak in Wuhan months before the international community was informed.³⁸ Much discourse about the claim raises the question of when national concerns become global

problems. Governments must share relevant information and take transparent actions to prevent global destruction.

The responsibility of having access to this information involves determining how it can be distributed, what it can be used for, and whether or not information can be collected without consent. As an international body, there is an obligation to create a precedent and ruling on how information is to be collected from other countries, how sovereignty and individual independence is to be respected, what kinds of information can be hidden, and what must be published. The resolutions created within this committee must compromise the wants of every country while keeping in mind long-term peace and technological growth.

History of Drone Use and Attacks

Drones are a rapidly growing technology, so it is important to have a clear understanding of their purpose, capabilities, and usage. The easiest way to categorize a drone is a “flying robot that can be remotely controlled or fly autonomously through software-controlled flight plans in their embedded

35 Ira S. Rubinstein, “Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis,” *International Data Privacy Law* 4, no. 2 (May 2014): 96–119, <https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipu004>.

36 Rubinstein, “Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis,” 96–119.

37 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, December 10, 1948, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

38 “Coronavirus: What Did China Do about Early Outbreak?” *BBC News*, Last modified May 10, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52573137>.



A commercially available surveillance drone
Credit: Sander Smeets

systems, working in conjunction with onboard sensors and GPS.”³⁹ This innovative technology has many uses, including revolutionizing war and conflict.

The UK tested its first unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in March 1917, and the US quickly followed in October 1918. Both showed tremendous power, but neither was actually used in combat. In 1935, the United Kingdom sent out its first radio-controlled drone used as target practice.⁴⁰ The first type of UAV to be released was used to collect information. The US flew them over Vietnam to track bomber targets and locate escape routes. Later during the war, UAVs were used for more direct impact, including the launch of missiles against planned targets and dropping leaflets to spread propaganda.⁴¹ After the end of the Vietnam War, drone technology started accelerating at a rapid pace. New models became much more effective and sophisticated and could be used for much more than just war activities. Examples include agriculture monitoring, healthcare delivery, and rescue efforts.⁴²

The evolution of drones is notable. Recent developments include information collection via hot air balloons, commercialization, and the distribution of weapons of mass destruction. Balloon drones are capable of many tasks. They can hold small bombs for enemy combat and carry flammable objects to drop over enemy territory without getting too close to the war zone.⁴³ Agricultural and industrial sites were the first two main markets for commercial drone use. They can be used for various purposes, including crop management, pest and pesticide inspection, and even the search for above-ground irrigation. They are not as common anymore because of the energy market, but they are still available for commercial use.⁴⁴

Drones have a variety of purposes. They can be used to collect information, do reconnaissance, or plan and carry out large-scale attacks. These aspects will be an important part of the conversation that the international community should discuss. Drone warfare has become controversial, with various investigative and research foundations focused on

³⁹ “Drone,” Cambridge English Dictionary, accessed August 24, 2022, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/drone>.

⁴⁰ “A Brief History of Drones,” Imperial War Museums, accessed July 5, 2022, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/a-brief-history-of-drones>.

⁴¹ David Axe, “Inside Vietnam’s Forgotten Drone War,” *The Daily Beast*, September 27, 2021, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-vietnams-forgotten-drone-war>.

⁴² “Here Are 3 Ways Drones Are Benefitting Society,” World Economic Forum, June 9, 2022, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/06/drones-medicines-farming-delivery/>.

⁴³ Jackie Alkobi, “The Evolution of Drones: From Military to Hobby & Commercial,” Percepto, January 15, 2019, <https://percepto.co/the-evolution-of-drones-from-military-to-hobby-commercial/>.

⁴⁴ Jackie Alkobi, “The Evolution of Drones: From Military to Hobby & Commercial.”

how, when, and where drone strikes are used and their impact on individual communities.⁴⁵ The controversy surrounding drone strikes come from confusion around whether the killing of civilians at such a large number is ever truly justified. Because there are no ground troops or markable boundaries, limits become blurry, and jurisdiction becomes confusing.⁴⁶ One of the biggest examples of this research is the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which has been researching the effects of US drone strikes in regions such as Pakistan and Somalia. In February of 2012, follow-up drone strikes in Pakistan killed at least 50 individuals who had gone to help victims of initial strikes.⁴⁷ The Bureau has dedicated resources to create a database for information on the effects of drone strikes worldwide, hoping to spread awareness about the wartime possibilities of drone technologies.⁴⁸

The first drone attack recorded was in November of 2002, when the CIA killed six targets for suspected participation in the extremist group Al-Qaeda and possible security threats in Yemen. Years later, in 2013, US President Barack Obama admitted that using drones in Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen led to over 4,000 casualties.⁴⁹ Since then, there have been over 500 drone strikes, and the issue of drone technology for military uses continues to be debated. One controversial aspect is whether troops should be on the ground if drones can make similar impacts. However, drones are not always accurate in their missions, and violent acts can be difficult to trace when committed remotely.⁵⁰ As these ethical dilemmas continue to arise, it is essential to keep in mind the possible impacts of these technologies as they continue to develop.

Ethical Dilemmas

Ethical dilemmas arise when the issues of right and wrong cannot be decided. These perspectives differ by country and

community based on cultural, religious, or personal beliefs. This poses a problem when creating laws for regulating controversial topics. However, the UN can publish certain guidelines for addressing these issues.

Ethics regarding surveillance are addressed in three different ways. First, whether surveillance is needed and who oversees the collected information should be addressed.⁵¹ The idea of surveillance is not entirely new, but when surveillance exceeds basic safety needs, privacy becomes a concern. Surveillance can be ethical, but certain issues must be addressed before justifying drastic measures. Lawmakers must consider the situations that surveillance would be beneficial and whether the benefits are for the greater population or the individuals holding the collected data.⁵²

The second concern is how information should be collected. The most common issue regarding this is whether citizens have the right to refuse if their actions are being recorded and monitored. Privacy is constantly debated, and with the progression of technology, debates about privacy have become incredibly complex.⁵³ A significant amount of legislation deals with information collection and where this information is stored, but situations need to be considered for when data collection is consensual and at what severity is privacy ignored. Information can be collected from various sources, whether tracking technology embedded into the internet or CCTV in everyday places around the neighborhood. Legal evidence is often thrown out because it was collected unethically or tampered with in some way.⁵⁴

The third concern regarding surveillance is where collected information goes. It is important to address the situations where information should be shared with local governments or the international community.⁵⁵ It is difficult to understand

45 Paul Lushenko, "What Makes a Drone Strike "legitimate" in the Eyes of the Public?" Brookings, May 05, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/05/what-makes-a-drone-strike-legitimate-in-the-eyes-of-the-public/>.

46 Center for Civilians in Conflict, *The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions* (New York: Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, 2012), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf

47 Center for Civilians in Conflict, *The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions*.

48 Center for Civilians in Conflict, *The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions*.

49 Lexy Leuszler, "The History behind and Future of Drone Warfare," Steppenwolf Theatre, accessed August 24, 2022, <https://www.steppenwolf.org/articles/the-history-behind-and-future-of-drone-warefare/>

50 Leuszler, "The History behind and Future of Drone Warfare."

51 Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

52 Macnish, "Surveillance Ethics."

53 Molla S. Donaldson, "Health Data in the Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy," National Academies Press, 1994, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236546/>.

54 Donaldson, "Health Data in the Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy."

55 Sudarshan Roy, "The State of Surveillance in India : Is It a Threat to Privacy," *ILeaders*, April 5, 2021, <https://blog.ileaders.in/state->

the extreme circumstances when all precedents and rights to reasonable privacy should be disregarded. For example, in India, the current political party made information easily accessible by creating laws that make surveillance justifiable if it is “necessary or expedient to do so.” The government has the power to intercept almost any form of information, including text messages and social media posts. It has established systems to alert the government if certain trigger words are used.⁵⁶ The dilemma here is determining in which situations an entity needs to act on this information and in what case this information would be revealed if it was targeting something outside the country.

Overall, these issues are addressed by specific countries, but conflict can arise when differing opinions clash with international effects. Without internationally agreed-upon policies, this continues to be a centrally debated point.

Drone technology also raises a variety of ethical concerns. Historically, this discussion is more confusing because it includes respect for life and finding the balance between security for one’s own country and the safety of others. At what point can a drone attack be launched without considering all of the civilians inhabiting the area?⁵⁷ The ethical debate about drones also relates to the conversation about privacy and monitoring systems. The predominant type of drone in these conversations is for military use, but considerations must be made for whether they should be used to gather intelligence and create land attacks. However, this fails to address drones that are owned and operated by civilians.⁵⁸ The issue now is whether or not the UN even has control over private property and the line between private property and a weapon of mass destruction. These gray areas and loopholes are what create the pathway to violence and destruction. The committee must come together to create baselines and policies that put the safety and well beings of citizens first.

Drone privacy laws vary around the world. They have been

[surveillance-india-threat-privacy/](#)

⁵⁶ Roy, “The State of Surveillance in India.”

⁵⁷ Stefan Wolff, “The Ethics of Warfare Part 3: How Does Drone Warfare Change the Debate?” University of Birmingham, accessed July 14, 2022, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/drones-wolff.aspx>.

⁵⁸ Wolff, “The Ethics of Warfare Part 3: How Does Drone Warfare Change the Debate?”

⁵⁹ Therese Jones, *International Commercial Drone Regulation and Drone Delivery Services* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1718z3/RAND_RR1718z3.pdf.

⁶⁰ Jones, *International Commercial Drone Regulation and Drone Delivery Services*

⁶¹ “About Monkeypox,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 22, 2022, <https://www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/monkeypox/about.html>.

implemented and enforced in various ways, all of which impact the global rulings and regulations to be made. According to researchers, there are five primary categories of regulation ranging from an outright ban to permissive approaches.⁵⁹ Analyzing these laws by region will allow this conflict to break into clear blocs and negotiation strategies. Most of North America has laws requiring an experimental visual line of sight, allowing pilots to fly drones outside their field of vision. The situation is quite the opposite in the Middle East and South Asia, as there is no synonymous policy or legislation. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria ban drones outright, while Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan have no drone-related legislation.⁶⁰ This can make wartime incredibly difficult because of varying infrastructure and weaponry.

The DISEC mandate and jurisdiction, in combination with the conversation of moral dilemmas, can be confusing and often feel out of place. The truth is that the laws and policies of DISEC will recommend the creation of the need to adhere to the ethical standards of all countries and the need to keep in mind the basic human rights established by the UN.

Current Status


Looking at Surveillance and Monitoring: Monkeypox

The most recent global issue that corresponds to the topic of surveillance and monitoring is the outbreak of monkeypox. With lots of misinformation being spread, many populations panic about the possibility of a new pandemic. Before discussing surveillance implications with monkeypox, it is important to understand how the disease spreads among populations, what infection looks like, and how the spread and infection rate can be monitored.⁶¹ While the virus manifests in each person differently, current symptoms of infection include rash or blisters on the hand and feet, fever,

Total confirmed deaths of COVID-19

The starting point for each country is the day that country had reached 5 confirmed deaths. This allows us to compare the trajectory of confirmed deaths between countries.

Limited testing and challenges in the attribution of the cause of death means that the number of confirmed deaths may not be an accurate count of the true number of deaths from COVID-19.



A graph showing the trajectory of COVID-19 deaths after the 5th confirmed death in the country

Credit: Our World in Data

chills, swollen lymph nodes, and respiratory symptoms. The symptoms typically start within three weeks of exposure, and the illness can persist for two to four weeks. The virus is transmitted amongst people through close interaction. It can enter a person’s system by touching objects that a person with monkeypox has used or touched, and it can also be transmitted during intimate contact.⁶²

Concerns about tracking the spread through infection numbers raise the issue of ethical surveillance. Health issues and epidemics are monitored very closely by a large number of international entities. To control this health sustained and prevent it from reaching numbers similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) has aggressively implemented tracking policies, surveillance measures, and case investigations.⁶³ There are a variety of policies the WHO is working to implement to keep the global community aware and updated. Some of the key points requested in the newest interim guidance template have been focused on reporting suspected cases, creating isolation environments, and, most importantly, reporting any changes

or discrepancies in symptoms to take note of any mutating strains.⁶⁴ WHO has asked clinicians who suspect this virus to report them as early as possible.

It is important to note how this virus is being treated compared to the COVID-19 pandemic. WHO has taken direct action over data collection and reporting to ensure transparency while creating an equitable source of information.⁶⁵ This was difficult to achieve with the COVID-19 pandemic because such a large outbreak as COVID-19 has not happened in recent years. Professionals did not anticipate that coronavirus would spread so quickly, and there was no means to share outbreak information. Many countries, states, and provinces kept outbreak information internal to prevent public panic, but this possibly led to the disease spreading faster.⁶⁶

A significant ethical concern related to health surveillance and data collection is the lack of tracking technologies or databases in rural communities. Harvard Medical School reported how different socioeconomic classes are impacted by health concerns in varying ways, with the three biggest areas

62 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “About Monkeypox.”

63 “Surveillance, Case Investigation and Contact Tracing for Monkeypox: Interim Guidance,” World Health Organization, August 25, 2022, <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-MPX-Surveillance-2022.3>.

64 Seema Farazi, “People, Operations and Values in a Global Crisis,” *Ernest and Young*, August 19, 2021, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/workforce/covid-19-how-firms-can-protect-their-workforce-operations-and-values.

65 “Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the World Health Assembly,” World Health Organization, May 24, 2021. <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-world-health-assembly---24-may-2021>.

66 Rebekah Rollston MD, “The Coronavirus Does Discriminate: How Social Conditions Are Shaping the COVID-19 Pandemic,” *Primary Care Review*, May 5, 2020, <https://info.primarycare.hms.harvard.edu/review/social-conditions-shape-covid>.

of impact being housing, transportation, and employment. Overcrowded homes can spread disease faster, and those with poor housing conditions are more likely to be exposed to the virus.⁶⁷ More impoverished people are more likely to live in overcrowded environments, making them more vulnerable to illnesses and diseases. Every day, millions of people use public transportation as an alternative way of getting to their job or school. However, this means that they are more likely to catch and spread a virus because of the proximity to others in public transportation. Disease and virus are statistically known to be 10 times more devastating in areas that are struggling financially, which is why it is important to address these outbreaks as early and as equitably as possible.⁶⁸

Various surveillance measures are being put in place to measure the scope of the monkeypox outbreak. These current systems track where the disease is coming from and where it spreads. It also records its genetic makeup to see if there are mutations that could create new variants.⁶⁹ Preemptive testing is being used to determine the presence of monkeypox in different communities, which has proved effective in possibly isolating certain populations with larger outbreaks of the disease. However, privacy concerns are raised about whether outbreaks in certain areas need to be publicized. Many countries call for full transparency in these situations, claiming it is a health matter for the general public. Other countries argue the importance of state sovereignty and how these issues should first be dealt with on a regional and national basis. This is often claimed to limit public panic and control the flow of information.⁷⁰ As the situation with monkeypox continues, the involvement of surveillance techniques will continue to be questioned.

67 Rollston, "The Coronavirus Does Discriminate: How Social Conditions Are Shaping the COVID-19 Pandemic."

68 Rollston, "The Coronavirus Does Discriminate: How Social Conditions Are Shaping the COVID-19 Pandemic."

69 Mark Kreidler, "Covid Sewage Surveillance Labs Join the Hunt for Monkeypox," *NPR*, August 8, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2022/08/08/1115455190/covid-sewage-surveillance-labs-join-the-hunt-for-monkeypox>.

70 Kreidler, "Covid Sewage Surveillance Labs Join the Hunt for Monkeypox."

71 "Israel-Gaza Violence: The Conflict Explained," *BBC News*, August 8, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44124396>.

72 Miryam Wijler and Ziv Stahl, *A Life Exposed: Military Invasions of Palestinian Homes in the West Bank*, (Israel: Physicians for Human Rights Israel, 2020), <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/life-exposed-military-invasions-palestinian-homes-west-bank>.

73 "A Threshold Crossed," Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution>.

74 "Born Without Civil Rights," Human Rights Watch, December 17, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/17/born-without-civil-rights/israels-use-draconian-military-orders-repress>.

75 Sophia Goodfriend, "How the Occupation Fuels Tel Aviv's Booming AI Sector," *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/21/palestine-israel-ai-surveillance-tech-hebron-occupation-privacy/>.

Israel and Palestine: Case Study of Surveillance

Beginning in the middle of the 20th century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been at the forefront of global affairs. The conflict is much deeper than politics or property lines; its origin lies in ethnoreligious identities and has led to the loss of thousands of lives and prolonged violence.⁷¹ This case study will focus on the role of surveillance in the Israeli-Palestinian situation.

The conflict has been at the forefront of the UN agenda, especially as the violence increasingly calls the attention of the DISEC committee. Surveillance within this conflict is a special subject because not only does it involve Israel and Palestine themselves, but their allies as well. Israel's digital surveillance of Palestine has had a large impact on the daily lives of Palestinians. As a result, there is a significant amount of social control and monitoring, usually unannounced and without consent from residents.⁷²

Harsher policies have been increasingly implemented without question from the international community.⁷³ Critics of Israel have claimed that government surveillance has become a tool to limit an individual's right to free expression. For example, the Human Rights Watch has found that IDF resources have been utilized to prevent opposing opinions in the media.⁷⁴ Closed-circuit television (CCTV) has been implemented throughout the region, which is a system of video cameras programmed to record and transmit information into a central database. Residents feel constantly monitored, as cameras overlook both public and private locations throughout communities.⁷⁵

In 2015, the Israeli government even passed new legislation calling for more surveillance, deploying over USD 15 million to monitor both Jerusalem and the Hebron territory of Palestine. This caused a major outcry because many believed



A security camera in the Cave of the Patriarchs in the Hebron region of the West Bank

Credit: Justin McIntosh

that the amount of surveillance already in place was quite substantial. Thus, populations felt as though all their freedoms had been stripped. However, the government of Israel said this surveillance was necessary to enhance security in the area and prevent future attacks. The improved cameras that were installed can identify both objects and people, raising concerns over infringements of privacy rights on the people living in the region.⁷⁶

Violations of privacy during this conflict have led to increasing amounts of tension and violence. While understanding the sovereignty of the states to implement policies for their security, the limits of surveillance in this region are constantly debated.

Sustainable Development Goals

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the blueprint for progress laid out by the UN. The idea of these goals is built on the idea of “leave no one behind,” and this new agenda introduces a holistic approach to sustainable development for all.⁷⁷ The DISEC mandate impacts all 17 Goals, but the topic of surveillance is directly connected to four: Good health

and Wellbeing; Climate Action; Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions; and Partnership for the Goals.

SDG 3: Good Health and Wellbeing, is focused on ensuring healthy lives for all people. This goal has been largely impacted within the last two years because of COVID-19.⁷⁸ Surveillance allows us to understand the state of health around the world. Collected data allows us to understand the communities most impacted by certain diseases or health risks. There is much debate regarding what kinds of data and information should be released and published, but the most important debate that comes between the cross-section of surveillance and health is what to do with countries who lack the resources to do proper reporting and data collection.

SDG 13: Climate Action also pertains to surveillance technology. Surveillance technology allows us to take and track information. It can give us regular information on how the planet is changing and, more importantly, in what specific regions of the world these changes are happening.⁷⁹ Fighting climate change is an issue every country is working to solve, and having accurate, accessible, and understandable information is crucial to making long-term change.

⁷⁶ Shtaya, “Nowhere to Hide: The Impact of Israel’s Digital Surveillance Regime on the Palestinians.”

⁷⁷ “Leave No One Behind,” United Nations, accessed August 14, 2022, <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/leave-no-one-behind>.

⁷⁸ “Goal 3,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed August 20, 2022, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3>.

⁷⁹ “Goal 13,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed August 20, 2022, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13>.

SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions aims to have systems and processes in place that are reliable and trustworthy. This works to create a way to hold people and communities accountable while making positive change. The UN promotes peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.⁸⁰ With disarmament being at the core of this committee's priorities, peace is a crucial priority. New and evolving technology also leads to the creation of a power dynamic, though, as only developed countries can truly test and utilize the new technology being created. Information is often weaponized, and it is incredibly difficult to try and find boundaries of how information can be used and made available to other entities.⁸¹ These are important features to consider when working to accomplish peace and justice through DISEC measures.

Most importantly, this topic deals with SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals. This goal is focused on creating relationships between countries to make real progress. Surveillance technology is something that impacts every corner of the world and gives many countries the chance to spread their wealth of information. This creates a network for the international community to come together to solve shared problems. Countries must collaborate and work dynamically to craft effective and critical legislation for this committee.⁸²

The SDGs have been sent forth by the UN to create long-term peace. The topic of surveillance ethics and drones heavily impacts all of the goals set out and, more importantly, impacts all countries regardless of their status on the issues. As a committee, it is our responsibility to find reasonable solutions that can be attained, understood, and implemented by all.

Bloc Analysis

The ethics of surveillance are constantly debated, as there is

no universal standard for what is acceptable. A privacy report conducted by the UN Human Rights Watch expressed that when done, surveillance must be necessary and proportionate.⁸³ Generally, human rights laws are focused on privacy, but many of these principles are not adhered to in cases of surveillance. It is important to address how collected information can be used and whether it can be used against a specific population. Furthermore, there should be more clarification of basic consent laws and if collected data can be published.

Analyzing the relationships between these blocs and a variety of countries allows the international community to create policies that can be enforced by all and reasonably expected. There may not be a strong consensus on how security should be dealt with or handled. However, there can be common ideas to help countries create policies that work for all involved parties. This topic must be addressed with discretion and sensitivity, as well as the careful collaboration of the countries in question.

There are numerous major political alliances worldwide, especially within the surveillance sector. One powerful group is the Five Eyes, a multilateral intelligence organization focused on domestic surveillance and sharing intelligence information between the signed nations. This original treaty has been expanded to include three different tiers of countries, all of which have different amounts of access to information and abilities to collect data. The original Five Eyes were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.⁸⁴ The pact was made after the fall of the Soviet Union and has been expanded since then to keep an eye on rising powers and take note of issues forming within different regions.

China has played a major role in the game of global surveillance and has recently made attempts to partner with smaller countries regarding security and mutual protections. Most recently, they signed a pact with the Solomon Islands regarding security and defense, leaving many countries in the

80 "Goal 16," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed August 20, 2022, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16>.

81 United Nations, *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament* (New York: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018), <https://www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/en/>.

82 "Goal 17," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed August 20, 2022, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17>.

83 "United Nations: Rein in Mass Surveillance," Human Rights Watch, July 17, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/17/united-nations-rein-mass-surveillance>

84 "Five Eyes: Privacy International," Privacy International, accessed August 14, 2022, <https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes>.

Asia-Pacific worried about Chinese influence in the region.⁸⁵ This relationship has been interesting to many other major players in the world because of how China impacts security and future relationships.

Countries that Monitor Drone Activity

Drones and digital technologies are crucial in establishing and ensuring global power dominance. Surveillance significantly impacts individuality, privacy, and democracy, as well as defines and understands the limits of federal power.⁸⁶ Drones are an example of how this innovative technology is being utilized to expand surveillance regimes. This is through mechanisms such as an experimental visual line of sight. Visual line of sight means the remote pilot maintains continuous, unaided visual contact with the unmanned aircraft, though they are not physically driving it. Major users of this technology include the United States, Russia, Canada, China, and Australia. The ability to surveil “under the radar” gives these countries a global political advantage. This is because they have greater access to sovereign regions. This access has broad military implications, including combat support, transportation, and intelligence gathering.⁸⁷ Additionally, there is an issue of access, as countries with fewer technological advantages and resources are not on the same playing field as the aforementioned powerful states.

While some countries actively utilize and monitor drone activities, some have an effective or outright ban on drones and UAVs. This essentially means that it is incredibly difficult to find a way to use or fly drones in any situation within these regions. There are over 20 countries that fall within this description, and they include Iran, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen.⁸⁸ These restrictions are in place due to a lack of understanding of drone technology, the growing global adoption of drone technology, and concerns regarding surveillance and privacy.

⁸⁵ Michael Miller, “China signs security deal with Solomon Islands, alarming neighbors,” *The Washington Post*, April 20, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/solomon-islands-china-security-agreement/>.

⁸⁶ John Muthyala, “Drones and Surveillance Cultures in a Global World,” *Digital Studies Le Champ Numérique*, September 27, 2019, <https://www.digitalstudies.org/article/id/7345/>.

⁸⁷ Jones, *International Commercial Drone Regulation and Drone Delivery Services*.

⁸⁸ “Master List of Drone Laws (Organized by State & Country),” *UAV Coach*, accessed August 23, 2022, <https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws/>.

⁸⁹ “Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide,” *UNCTAD*, accessed August 18, 2022, <https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide>.

⁹⁰ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Standards.”

⁹¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Standards.”

⁹² “General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),” *European Union*, accessed August 13, 2022, <https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/>.

Countries that Explicitly Protect the Right to Privacy

Some countries in DISEC have ratified legislation or international standards that uphold and protect the right to privacy. According to data from the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 137 out of 194 countries have legislation that explicitly secures the protection of data and privacy. There are, however, some variations in this regionally. For example, in Asia and Africa, the level of adoption of privacy legislation drops to 61 and 57 percent, respectively.⁸⁹ More specifically, this legislation varies from measures such as cybercrime laws, e-transaction policies, as well as consumer protection measures. Though many may support surveillance expansion, countries in this bloc are likely to significantly prioritize privacy measures and safeguards.

Many countries in this bloc affirm the international standard for the right to privacy. This is important to emphasize as it provides a streamlined framework for protecting privacy, as included in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.⁹⁰ There are also regional protections and similar provisions provided internationally. Notable countries that would fall under this category would be those who are parties to declarations. Examples include the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework.⁹¹ These provisions are typically quite broad, but in some cases, countries are more stringent and precise with their data privacy policies. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union prioritizes data protection accountability, emphasizes consent, and imposes hefty fines on violators of the outlined measures.⁹² While many members of this bloc may not have legislation as strict as the GDPR,

they will all advocate for data protection initiatives and individual privacy rights.

Countries that Lack Surveillance Regulations

Countries often have no specific surveillance regulations for two primary reasons: a lack of significant drone infrastructure or no relevant legislation regarding the use of drones and UAVs. According to the aforementioned UNCTAD study, 15 percent of the 194 countries researched had no data protection or privacy legislation. Examples of countries in this bloc include Kazakhstan, Libya, Mongolia, and Sudan.⁹³ Countries within this bloc may be disadvantaged due to a lack of access to digital resources or advanced technology. As a result, members of this bloc may be hesitant to expand surveillance and broaden international involvement in privacy provisions. Furthermore, countries in this bloc may not have the financial resources to invest in modern surveillance technologies such as drones. One of this bloc's focuses is improving surveillance while being conscious of the resources available to do so.

Committee Mission

The UN is the pioneer for change and progress all around the world. The issue of surveillance ethics is of the utmost importance to understand how this concept interacts with those larger goals. Using the resources and previous resolutions DISEC has passed, delegates can learn more about how this committee functions and what previous resolutions have led to substantial change.⁹⁴

Research and proposed solutions must revolve around the DISEC mandate. DISEC pledges to deal with “disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.”⁹⁵ With disarmament being at the center of this committee's topic, a major theme and priority of the committee is to ensure and advocate for peace and safety. DISEC emphasizes issues of security and demilitarization, ensuring that members of the global population are protected, especially in the surveillance realm.

⁹³ UNCTAD, “Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide.”

⁹⁴ “United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly,” United Nations, accessed August 27, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>.

⁹⁵ United Nations, “United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly.”

When focusing on resolutions, certain topics may create tension, including enforcement of surveillance legislation and funding of proposed programs.

As delegates of your representative countries, your role is the most important and must be the focus to create effective resolutions to the topic at hand. As technology changes every day, delegates must consider innovative strategies to address the issue of global surveillance and its related controversies. It is essential to protect the peace and prosperity of each Member State.

Research and Preparation Questions

Your dais has prepared the following research and preparation questions as a means of providing guidance for your research process. These questions should be carefully considered, as they embody some of the main critical thought and learning objectives surrounding your topic.

Topic A

1. What is your country's position regarding the rapidly evolving nuclear, biological and chemical technologies across the world?
2. Has your country introduced a policy to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction?
3. What measures can be taken to improve existing treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Resolution 1540? Should new regulations and agreements be created?
4. Has your country been a victim of threats or attacks related to violent non-state actors such as terrorist organizations? If so, what measures were implemented to address the issue?
5. What are your country's cyberwarfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive? Has your country made any statements about this new frontier of WMD use?
6. Does your country enjoy good or bad relationships with countries that have violated international WMD laws, such as Syria and North Korea?

Topic B

1. What surveillance capabilities does your country have? Are they able to deploy drones?
2. What laws has your country passed regarding surveillance and privacy for civilians? Are there exceptions in those laws for military use?
3. What kinds of international bodies should have jurisdiction over UAVs as weapons of destruction? How can the use of drones be effectively controlled?
4. How did the COVID-19 pandemic affect the limitation of health surveillance? Which policies have become permanent?
5. Has your country been targeted by foreign surveillance programs? What has the response to those programs been once they are revealed?

Important Documents

Topic A

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